Index

Contents

Index	1

SMR 1AC Outline	3

Contention 1: Inherency	4

Plan	7

Contention 1: Military Capabilities	8

Contention 2: Nuclear Industry	16

Contention 3: Solvency	27

Nuclear Industry 1AC	36

Contention 1: Inherency	37

Plan	40

Contention 2: Nuclear Industry	41

Contention 3: Solvency	64

SMR 1AC Outline

Contention 1: Inherency

The DOE spent 450 million dollars on SMR’s this year and Obama has taken credit- takes out any perception or funding disads

Energy.gov ’12 (Energy.gov, “Obama Administration Announces $450 Million to Design and Commercialize U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, http://energy.gov/articles/obama-administration-announces-450-million-design-and-commercialize-us-small-modular, March 22, 2012, LEQ)

Obama Administration Announces $450 Million to Design and Commercialize U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors. Today, as President Obama went to Ohio State University to discuss the all-out, all-of-the-above strategy for American energy, the White House announced new funding to advance the development of American-made small modular reactors (SMRs), an important element of the President’s energy strategy. A total of $450 million will be made available to support first-of-its-kind engineering, design certification and licensing for up to two SMR designs over five years, subject to congressional appropriations. Manufacturing these reactors domestically will offer the United States important export opportunities and will advance our competitive edge in the global clean energy race. Small modular reactors, which are approximately one-third the size of current nuclear plants, have compact, scalable designs that are expected to offer a host of safety, construction and economic benefits. “The Obama Administration and the Energy Department are committed to an all-of-the-above energy strategy that develops every source of American energy, including nuclear power, and strengthens our competitive edge in the global clean energy race,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. “Through the funding for small modular nuclear reactors announced today, the Energy Department and private industry are working to position America as the leader in advanced nuclear energy technology and manufacturing.” Through cost-share agreements with private industry, the Department will solicit proposals for promising SMR projects that have the potential to be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and achieve commercial operation by 2022. These cost-share agreements will span a five-year period and, subject to congressional appropriations, will provide a total investment of approximately $900 million, with at least 50 percent provided by private industry. SMRs can be made in factories and transported to sites where they would be ready to “plug and play” upon arrival, reducing both capital costs and construction times. The smaller size also makes SMRs ideal for small electric grids and for locations that cannot support large reactors, offering utilities the flexibility to scale production as demand changes. Today’s announcement builds on the Obama Administration’s efforts to help jumpstart America’s nuclear energy industry that include: · In 2010, the Department signed a conditional commitment for $8 billion in loan guarantees to support the Vogtle project, where the Southern Company and Georgia Power are building two new nuclear reactors, helping to create new jobs and export opportunities for American workers and businesses. · The Energy Department has also supported the Vogtle project and the development of the next generation of nuclear reactors by providing more than $200 million through a cost-share agreement to support the licensing reviews for Westinghouse’s AP1000 reactor design certification. The Vogtle license is the first for new nuclear power plant construction in more than three decades. · Promoting a sustainable nuclear industry in the U.S. also requires cultivating the next generation of scientists and engineers. Over the past three years, the Department has invested $170 million in research grants at more than 70 universities, supporting R&D into a full spectrum of technologies, from advanced reactor concepts to enhanced safety design.

And DOD is performing 50 energy demonstrations now

Sarewitz et al ’12 (Daniel Sarewitz and Samuel Thernstrom Co-Directors, John Alic Technical Consultant, and Writer Travis Doom Research Assistant, A joint project of CSPO and CATF, We are grateful for their time and their insights. Fred Beach Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Texas at Austin William Bonvillian Washington Office Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hanna Breetz PhD Candidate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Kay Sullivan Faith Graduate Fellow, RAND Erica Fuchs Assistant Professor of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University Ken Gabriel Deputy Director, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Anthony Galasso Director of Advanced Integration Capabilities, Boeing Phantom Works David Garman Consultant Eugene Gholz Associate Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin Sherri Goodman Senior Vice President, Center for Naval Analysis Kevin Hurst Assistant Director for Energy R&D, Office of Science and Technology Policy John Jennings Deputy Director for Innovation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Todd Laporte Professor of Political Science, University of California Berkley George Lea Military Branch Chief, Engineering and Construction, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sasha Mackler Bipartisan Policy Center Jeffrey Marqusee Executive Director, SERDP and ESTCP, U.S. Department of Defense William McQuaid Liaison for DoD Energy Conservation Programs, Office of Management and Budget Srini Mirmira Commercialization, Advance Research Projects Agency-Energy Dorothy Robyn Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment Richard Van Atta Institute for Defense Analyses Andrew Wiedlea Defense Threat Reduction Agency Aubrey Wigner Graduate Student, Arizona State University Project Staff and Affiliates Daniel Sarewitz Co-Director, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Samuel Thernstrom Senior Climate Policy Advisor, Clean Air Task Force John Alic Consultant Travis Doom Program Specialist, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Joseph Chaisson Research and Technical Director, Clean Air Task Force Armond Cohen Executive Director, Clean Air Task Force Nate Gorence Associate Director for Energy Innovation, Bipartisan Policy Center Suzanne Landtiser Graphic Designer, Fine Line Studio, “Energy Innovation At The Department Of Defense Assessing The Opportunities”, March 2012, LEQ)

DoD began the Installation Energy Test Bed as a pilot program in 2009 with $20 million in funds from the Stimulus Act. Seeing the value of these demonstrations, in 2010 the Department directed $30 million from the Energy Conservation Investment Program, a flexible military construction budget line, to ESTCP to continue the test bed. For FY2012, the President’s budget proposes $30 million in RDT&E funds for the test bed. ESTCP has successfully piloted the test bed over the last two years. Each year, ESTCP has invited private firms, universities, and government labs to identify emerging technologies that would meet DoD installation needs. The response from industry has been extremely strong: many of the ongoing demonstrations are viewed as critical elements in the business plans of both large and small companies seeking to bring their technologies to full commercialization and widespread deployment. In 2010, ESTCP received more than 300 proposals from leading corporations in the building energy sector, small start-ups with venture capital funding, and the major DOE labs. The proposals were reviewed by teams made up of technical experts from inside and outside of DoD, as well as service representatives familiar with the installations’ needs. Winning proposals (about 15 percent of the total submitted) were then matched up with a service and an installation at which to demonstrate the technology. ESTCP expected some of the early projects to begin to show results in late 2011. The most recent solicitation closed in late March 2011; ESTCP received 600 preproposals whose combined requested funds were over a billion dollars. The timing for an energy test bed is ideal, which is one reason the response from industry has been so strong. The federal government is investing significant resources in building energy R&D, largely through the Department of Energy, and the private sector is making even larger investments, as evidenced by the growth of venture capital backing for “clean tech.” As a structured demonstration program linked to the large DoD market, the ESTCP test bed can leverage these resources for the military’s benefit. The test bed program carries out demonstrations in three broad technical areas: energy component technologies, both for efficiency and generation; system approaches to building energy control, management, and decision making; and installation-level smart-microgrid technologies. Component Technologies The test bed program demonstrates and evaluates advanced component technologies for both demand reduction and distributed generation—technologies that, due to real or perceived risks, are not being used across DoD. The value of these technologies is very cost sensitive: a new component must provide equal or better performance while reducing life-cycle costs. Life-cycle costs are highly sensitive to a number of factors, including the technology’s operational efficiency, its maintenance costs, and the component’s life expectancy. For technologies that appear particularly promising, ESTCP shoulders the cost of first implementation, feeds information back to the developers, and stimulates the adoption of technologies that have been shown to be cost-effective. This also saves DoD the expense of having costly mistakes repeated at individual installations. One example of DoD’s approach is the pilot program currently testing building integrated photo voltaic (BIPV) technologies. BIPV technologies are commercially available and could be deployed on thousands of DoD flat roofs; they could be installed during required roof replacements in place of a traditional roof, providing both a protective roof and a source of energy. Currently, however, neither the Army Corps of Engineers nor the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) includes BIPV as a roofing option, because neither has data on the performance of the technology. The pilot program is collecting detailed data on the performance of BIPV along multiple criteria. NAVFAC leads this project in collaboration with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Systems Approaches to Energy Control and Management Although individual component technologies are important, the largest potential payoff lies in the opportunities to integrate technologies throughout a building and across an entire installation. Unlike other DoD platforms, such as aircraft and ships, buildings and installations have not been designed or maintained with a systems perspective. They are complex entities with many nonlinear interactions that affect energy flows and operations. A systems approach is needed to optimize performance for individual buildings and building clusters within an installation. Systems approaches will focus on new design tools and the exploitation of distributed sensors linked to innovative control strategies. In addition to the impediments to commercialization discussed above, systems approaches face another major obstacle: the lack of real-world testing, particularly in the retrofit market, where DoD has the greatest interest. DoD has a unique opportunity in this area due to the nature of its installations and the unique security concerns associated with information assurance that a demonstration must address. For example, the pilot program is testing an innovative approach to “continuous building commissioning.” Over time, the energy performance of buildings degrades; most buildings rarely meet their design intent, much less perform optimally. Advances in monitoring and modeling tools now make it possible to continuously optimize building performance. Two pilot projects demonstrating a whole-building monitoring system are assessing its ability to do the following: 1) Identify, classify, and quantify deviations from design intent or optimal performance regarding consumption of energy and water in the building; 2) Classify and identify the root causes of such deviation; 3) Identify corrective actions; and 4) Quantify the value of these actions in terms of energy and water savings and other economic benefits. Project participants include United Technologies Research Center (lead), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the University of California at Berkeley, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Smart-Microgrid Technologies In addition to demand reduction and increased distributed energy generation, DoD’s energy security goal requires the deployment of smart-microgrid technologies that allow DoD installations to “island” and provide operational capability in the event of grid failure. These same technologies offer DoD opportunities to reduce operational costs through demand response management. DoD’s requirement for this class of technology puts it in a unique position: although DoD has security concerns not found in the private sector, it expects to use commercial smart-grid technologies in the future, rather than developing its own solutions. Standards and smart-grid technologies are expected to change significantly in the coming years; DoD should not adopt an approach that is independent of, or inconsistent with, the changing commercial market. The test bed program will demonstrate emerging commercial technologies configured to meet DoD’s unique security needs, and evaluate the critical operational and information security issues related to the use of these technologies. For example, the pilot program is currently testing a General Electric smart-microgrid technology at the Marine Corps’ Twentynine Palms installation in California. The technology is designed to manage and control the complicated interactions among heat and electrical power generation, power demand, energy storage, and power distribution and delivery. It can also optimize energy usage, and offers energy security by managing backup power operation for critical loads if the microgrid is disconnected from the bulk grid (or “islanded”). The technology is scalable and is applicable to multiple DoD installations that contain renewable resources. However, the economic value and security of such a system cannot be determined in the absence of real-world testing on a DoD installation. The system needs to be integrated with real-world generation and loads to assess its performance and finalize design details. To date, nearly 50 demonstrations are under way across DoD as part of ESTCP’s Installation Energy Test Bed (see figure 3.8). DoD plans to continue this program in FY2012. A competitive process is under way to identify the next round of technology demonstrations in the following areas: 1) Smart microgrids and energy storage to increase energy security on DoD installations 2) Renewable energy generation on DoD installations 3) Advanced component technologies to improve building energy efficiency 4) Advanced building energy management and control 5) Tools and processes for design, assessment, and decision making associated with energy use and management The interest from industry has been extremely high. Companies see the ongoing demonstrations as crucial means of bringing their technologies to full commercialization and widespread deployment. The current solicitation has attracted enormous interest, highlighting the pent-up need for efforts to move energy technologies beyond research and development and to overcome the Valley of Death.

Plan

Plan: The Department of Defense should initiate a power-purchase agreement of Small Modular Reactors.

Contention 1: Military Capabilities

Small Modular Reactors are key to sustain US warfighting capabilities- two internal links

First is reliance on the grid

SMR’s are key to “island” military bases from the grid- blackouts will collapse the military- this independently jacks space systems

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah J. Loudermilk, Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Nuclear Reactors: Enabling Energy Security for Warfighters”, March 27, 2011, LEQ)

Last month, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University released a report entitled Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. Authored by Dr. Richard Andres of the National War College and Hanna Breetz from Harvard University, the paper analyzes the potential for the Department of Defense to incorporate small reactor technology on its domestic military bases and in forward operating locations. According to Andres and Breetz, the reactors have the ability to solve two critical vulnerabilities in the military's mission: the dependence of domestic bases on the civilian electrical grid and the challenge of supplying ample fuel to troops in the field. Though considerable obstacles would accompany such a move -- which the authors openly admit -- the benefits are significant enough to make the idea merit serious consideration. At its heart, a discussion about military uses of small nuclear reactors is really a conversation about securing the nation's warfighting capabilities. Although the point that energy security IS national security has become almost redundant -- quoted endlessly in government reports, think tank papers, and the like -- it is repeated for good reason. Especially on the domestic front, the need for energy security on military bases is often overlooked. There is no hostile territory in the United States, no need for fuel convoys to constantly supply bases with fuel, and no enemy combatants. However, while bases and energy supplies are not directly vulnerable, the civilian electrical grid on which they depend for 99% of their energy use is -- and that makes domestic installations highly insecure. The U.S. grid, though a technological marvel, is extremely old, brittle, and susceptible to a wide variety of problems that can result in power outages -- the 2003 blackout throughout the Northeast United States is a prime example of this. In the past, these issues were largely limited to accidents including natural disasters or malfunctions, however today, intentional threats such as cyber attacks represent a very real and growing threat to the grid. Advances in U.S. military technology have further increased the risk that a grid blackout poses to the nation's military assets. As pointed out by the Defense Science Board, critical missions including national strategic awareness and national command authorities depend on the national transmission grid. Additionally, capabilities vital to troops in the field -- including drones and satellite intelligence/reconnaissance -- are lodged at bases within the United States and their loss due to a blackout would impair the ability of troops to operate in forward operating areas. Recognition of these facts led the Defense Science Board to recommend "islanding" U.S. military installations to mitigate the electrical grid's vulnerabilities. Although DOD has undertaken a wide array of energy efficiency programs and sought to construct renewable energy facilities on bases, these endeavors will fall far short of the desired goals and still leave bases unable to function in the event of long-term outages. As the NDU report argues though, small nuclear reactors have the potential to alleviate domestic base grid vulnerabilities. With a capacity of anywhere between 25 and 300 megawatts, small reactors possess sufficient generation capabilities to power any military installation, and most likely some critical services in the areas surrounding bases, should a blackout occur. Moreover, making bases resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to disrupt the grid in the event of a conflict as military capabilities would be unaffected. Military bases are also secure locations, reducing the associated fears that would surely arise from the distribution of reactors across the country.

Independently- space systems are key to US hegemony

Imburgia ‘11 (Lt. Col. and Judge Advocate in Air Force, Joseph S. Imburgia, J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law (2002); LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Va. (2009)), a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force and is presently assigned as a legal exchange officer to the Directorate of Operations and International Law, Defence Legal, Australian Defence Force, Canberra, Australia, 2011, “Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk,” Scholar)

These gloomy prognostications about the threats to our space environment should be troubling to Americans. The United States relies on the unhindered use of outer space for national security.151 According to a space commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “[United States is more dependent on space than any other nation.”152 According to Robert G. Joseph, former Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security at the State Department, “space capabilities are vital to our national security and to our economic well-being.”153 Therefore, a catastrophic collision between space debris and the satellites on which that national security so heavily depends poses a very real and current threat to the national security interests of the United States. Since “the [1991] Gulf War, the [United States] military has depended on satellites for communications, intelligence and navigation for its troops and precision-guided weapons.”154 Satellites are also used for reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, and control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.155 According to the United States Space Command’s Fact Sheet: Satellites provide essential in-theater secure communications, weather and navigational data for ground, air and fleet operations and threat warning. Ground-based radar and Defense Support Program satellites monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard against a surprise missile attack on North America. Space surveillance radars provide vital on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging capability required to protect our space assets.156 With the modern speed of warfare, it has become difficult to fight conflicts without the timely intelligence and information that space assets provide. Space-based assets and space-controlled assets have created among U.S. military commanders “a nearly insatiable desire for live video surveillance, especially as provided from remotely piloted vehicles like the Predator and now the Reaper.”157 Moreover, military forces have become so dependent on satellite communications and targeting capabilities that the loss of such a satellite would “badly damage their ability to respond to a military emergency.”158 In fact, the May 2008 malfunction of a communications satellite demonstrates the fragile nature of the satellite communications system.159 The temporary loss of a single satellite “effectively pulled the plug on what executives said could [have been] as much as 90 percent of the paging network in the United States.”160 Although this country’s paging network is perhaps not vital to its national security, the incident demonstrates the possible national security risks created by the simultaneous loss of multiple satellites due to space debris collisions. Simply put, the United States depends on space-based assets for national security, and those assets are vulnerable to space debris collisions. As Massachusetts Democratic Congressman Edward Markey stated, “American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security.”161 The Rumsfeld Commission set the groundwork for such a conclusion in 2001, when it discussed the vulnerability of U.S. space-based assets and warned of the Space Pearl Harbor.162 Congress also recognized this vulnerability in June 2006, when it held hearings concerning space and its import to U.S. national power and security.163 In his June 2006 Congressional Statement, Lieutenant General C. Robert Kehler, then the Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command, stated that “space capabilities are inextricably woven into the fabric of American security.”164 He added that these space capabilities are “vital to our daily efforts throughout the world in all aspects of modern warfare” and discussed how integral space capabilities are to “defeating terrorist threats, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and preventing hostile states and actors from acquiring or using WMD.”165 Because so much of the United States’ security depends on satellites, these integral space-based capabilities would, therefore, be costly to lose. That loss would be felt in more than just the security arena. Due to the steep price tags attached to some of the national space security platforms, the economic loss of a satellite due to space debris would also be significant. For example, a pair of new Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), which provides valuable targeting and battle space awareness to military commanders, costs $1.5 billion.166 Accordingly, if a piece of space debris destroys one of these satellites, $750 million could be lost instantly. Additionally, NASA invests billions of dollars annually in space assets. Congress provided NASA with $18.3 billion to spend on space utilization and exploration for fiscal year 2010, and it provided $17.7 billion for fiscal year 2011.167 Air Force General (retired) Ronald E. Keys, former Commander of Air Combat Command, summed it up best, stating that a great deal “rides on space-borne satellites.”168 Because these space capabilities are so costly yet so vital to the United States’ national security and economic well-being, the preservation of these space capabilities should also be vital

The second internal link is operational vulnerability-

Dependency on oil for forward-deployed bases has become an Achilles Heel - SMR’s are key to fuel in-theatre military endeavors

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

Operational Vulnerability. Operational energy use represents a second serious vulnerability for the U.S. military. In recent years, the military has become significantly more effective by making greater use of technology in the field. The price of this improvement has been a vast increase in energy use. Over the last 10 years, for instance, the Marine Corps has more than tripled its operational use of energy. Energy and water now make up 70 percent of the logistics burden for troops operating in forward locations in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This burden represents a severe vulnerability and is costing lives. In 2006, troop losses from logistics convoys became so serious that Marine Corps Major General Rich- ard Zilmer sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” request for renewable energy backup.11 This unprecedented request put fuel convoy issues on the national security agenda, triggering several high-level studies and leading to the establishment of the Power Surety Task Force, which fast-tracked energy innovations such as mobile power stations and super-insulating spray foam. Currently, the Marine Corps is considering a goal of producing all non- vehicle energy used at forward bases organically and substantially increasing the fuel efficiency of vehicles used in forward areas. Nevertheless, attempts to solve the current energy use problem with efficiency measures and renewable sources are unlikely to fully address this vulnerability. Wind, solar, and hydro generation along with tailored cuts of energy use in the field can reduce the number of convoys needed to supply troops, but these measures will quickly reach limits and have their own challenges, such as visibility, open exposure, and intermittency. Deploying vehicles with greater fuel efficiency will further reduce convoy vulnerability but will not solve the problem. A strong consensus has been building within planning circles that small reactors have the potential to significantly reduce liquid fuel use and, consequently, the need for convoys to supply power at forward locations. Just over 30 percent of operational fuel used in Afghanistan today goes to generating electricity. Small reactors could easily generate all electricity needed to run large forward operating bases. This innovation would, for in- stance, allow the Marine Corps to meet its goal of self- sufficient bases. Mobile reactors also have the potential to make the Corps significantly lighter and more mobile by reducing its logistics tail. Another way that small reactors could potentially be used in the field is to power hydrogen electrolysis units to generate hydrogen for vehicles.12 At forward locations, ground vehicles currently use around 22 percent imported fuel. Many ground transport vehicles can be converted to run on hydrogen, considerably reducing the need for fuel convoys. If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are indicative of future operations, and fuel convoys remain a target for enemy action, using small reactors at forward locations has the potential to save hundreds or thousands of U.S. lives.

This risks disrupting hegemony and military capabilities- dependency on oil puts the military on razor’s edge

Voth ’12 (Jeffrey M. Voth is the president of Herren Associates leading a team of consultants advising the federal government on issues of national security, energy and environment, health care and critical information technology infrastructure, George Washing University Homeland Security Policy Institute, “In Defense of Energy – A Call to Action”, http://securitydebrief.com/2012/04/11/in-defense-of-energy-a-call-to-action/, April 11, 2012, LEQ)

Last month, the Pentagon released its widely anticipated roadmap to transform operational energy security. As published in a World Politics Review briefing, energy security has become a strategic as well as an operational imperative for U.S. national security. As tensions continue to escalate with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, it has become clear that the U.S. military urgently requires new approaches and innovative technologies to improve fuel efficiency, increase endurance, enhance operational flexibility and support a forward presence for allied forces while reducing the vulnerability inherent in a long supply-line tether. Assured access to reliable and sustainable supplies of energy is central to the military’s ability to meet operational requirements globally, whether keeping the seas safe of pirates operating off the coast of Africa, providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters in the Pacific or supporting counterterrorism missions in the Middle East. From both a strategic and an operational perspective, the call to action is clear. Rapid employment of energy-efficient technologies and smarter systems will be required to transform the military’s energy-security posture while meeting the increasing electric-power demands required for enhanced combat capability. As recently outlined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, “Without improving our energy security, we are not merely standing still as a military or as a nation, we are falling behind.”

Independently- fuel dependency wrecks the DOD’s budget through oil cost- spills over into other projects

Freed ’12 (Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy, Third Way, “Improving capability, protecting budget”, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php, May 21, 2012, LEQ)

As Third Way explains in a digest being released this week by our National Security Program, the Pentagon’s efforts to reduce energy demand and find alternative energy sources could keep rising fuel costs from encroaching on the budgets of other important defense programs. And the payoff could be massive. The Air Force has already been able to implement behavioral and technology changes that will reduce its fuel costs by $500 million over the next five years. The Army has invested in better energy distribution systems at several bases in Afghanistan, which will save roughly $100 million each year. And, using less than 10% of its energy improvement funds, the Department has begun testing advanced biofuels for ships and planes. This relatively small investment could eventually provide the services with a cost-effective alternative to the increasingly expensive and volatile oil markets. These actions are critical to the Pentagon’s ability to focus on its defense priorities. As Secretary Panetta recently pointed out, he’s facing a $3 billion budget shortfall caused by “higher-than-expected fuel costs.” The Department’s energy costs could rise even further if action isn’t taken. DOD expects to spend $16 billion on fuel next year. The Energy Information Administration predicts the price of oil will rise 23% by 2016, without a major disruption in oil supplies, like the natural disasters, wars, and political upheaval the oil producing states have seen during the last dozen years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s planned budget, which will remain flat for the foreseeable future, will require significant adjustment to the Department’s pay-any-price mindset, even if sequestration does not go into effect. Unless energy costs are curbed, they could begin to eat into other budget priorities for DOD. In addition, the Pentagon’s own Defense Science Board acknowledges that using energy more efficiently makes our forces more flexible and resilient in military operations, and can provide them with greater endurance during missions. Also, by reducing energy demand in the field, DOD can minimize the number of fuel convoys that must travel through active combat zones, reducing the chances of attack to avoiding casualties and destruction of material. At our domestic bases, DOD is employing energy conservation, on-site clean energy generation, and smart grid technology to prevent disruptions to vital activities in case the civilian grid is damaged by an attack or natural disaster. The bottom line is, developing methods and technologies to reduce our Armed Forces’ use of fossil fuels and increase the availability of alternative energy makes our military stronger. That’s why the Pentagon has decided to invest in these efforts. End of story.

Third is the impacts-

Collapse of American military power would take globalization and the world down with it

Barnett ’11 (Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor @ Naval War College, 11 (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

Military readiness is the vital internal link to stabilize every isolated impact- terrorism, economic collapse, Russia, China, and Failing States

Bennett ‘8 (John T. Bennett, Staff Writer for Army Times, “JFCOM releases study on future threats”, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/defense_jfcom_report_120408/, December 4, 2008, LEQ)

A new U.S. Joint Forces Command planning document offers insights into planning for irregular conflicts, urges long-promised acquisition reform, and outlines potential threats and enemies. Released Thursday, the “Joint Operating Environment” document is a “historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent implications,” Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, JFCOM commander, writes in its foreword. “Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.” The study is meant to inform joint concept development and experimentation by the U.S. military and “other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” The study is largely a response to three questions: • What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect the joint force over the next quarter century? • How are these trends and disruptions likely to define the future contexts for joint operations? • What are the implications of these trends and contexts for the joint force?” Its authors considered politics, military efforts, demographic changes, globalization, economic trends, energy competition, food and water scarcity, climate change, cyber threats and pandemics. The study predicts future U.S. forces’ missions will range “from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons.” Some of these missions will be spawned by “rational political calculation,” others by “uncontrolled passion.” And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. “Our enemy’s capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks,” the study said. “The threat of mass destruction — from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons — will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks.” The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in “an era of persistent conflict.” During the next 25 years, it says, “There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world’s economy.” The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, such as Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region. EXTREMISTS AND MILITIAS But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia “the center of instability” where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups. The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation’s military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes such as those that complicated the Iraq war for years. Leaders must avoid “the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s,” the study said. “The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War.” Irregular wars are likely to be carried out by terrorist groups, “modern-day militias,” and other non-state actors, the study said. It noted the 2006 tussle between Israel and Hezbollah, a militia that “combines state-like technological and war-fighting capabilities with a ‘sub-state’ political and social structure inside the formal state of Lebanon.” One retired Army colonel called the study “the latest in a serious of glaring examples of massive overreaction to a truly modest threat” — Islamist terrorism. “It is causing the United States to essentially undermine itself without terrorists or anyone else for that matter having to do much more than exploit the weaknesses in American military power the overreaction creates,” said Douglas Macgregor, who writes about Defense Department reform at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. “Unfortunately, the document echoes the neocons, who insist the United States will face the greatest threats from insurgents and extremist groups operating in weak or failing states in the Middle East and Africa.” Macgregor called that “delusional thinking,” adding that he hopes “Georgia’s quick and decisive defeat at the hands of Russian combat forces earlier this year [is] a very stark reminder why terrorism and fighting a war against it using large numbers of military forces should never have been made an organizing principle of U.S. defense policy.” FAILING STATES The study also warns about weak and failing states, including Mexico and Pakistan. “Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons,” said the study. “That ‘perfect storm’ of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used.” On Mexico, JFCOM warns that how the nation’s politicians and courts react to a “sustained assault” by criminal gangs and drug cartels will decide whether chaos becomes the norm on America’s southern border. “Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone,” said the report. But Macgregor warns against forming military plans around repairing ailing nations. “The world is full of failed states and always has been. Trying to rectify this situation by governing and developing failed societies and said with American military power will bankrupt us and change nothing of substance in these regions,” he said. “It’s time Americans woke up and recognized that so-called [counterinsurgency] in Iraq, along with the nation-building it implies, is a euphemism for territorial imperialism, an economic, military and political loser.” Macgregor said the study seems to suggest the U.S. military should prepare to conduct operations like the one in Iraq in the future. Using the American military to try and impose a Western-style democracy in Iraq — which Macgregor dubs “altruistic imperialism” — has proven difficult, and may yet still fail, he said. “So why would we want to repeat this foolishness again and again?” BEAR AND DRAGON The JFCOM study team examines potential rival nations China and Russia. Beijing is dealing with domestic social and economic issues, building up its large military, and keeping a keen eye on Western nations’ economic and military developments. Evidence suggests Chinese officials think their country can compete with America on a near-equal footing in areas such as submarines, space,and cyber warfare, the study said. Yet “the Chinese have drawn the lesson that they must not pursue military development at the expense of economic development” — that means no traditional arms race, the study said. “If one examines their emerging military capabilities in intelligence, submarines, cyber, and space, one sees an asymmetrical operational approach that is different from Western approaches, one consistent with the classical Chinese strategic thinkers.” The report describes a Russia increasingly controlled by security services and funded by oil and gas sales. Yet its authors conclude that it is doubtful Moscow would be able to rebuild the “military machine of the old Soviet Union.” Instead, they say, Russian officials “may be attempting to make up for demographic and conventional military inferiority by modernizing its nuclear forces, including warheads, delivery systems, and doctrines,” according to the report. “It is also exploring and fielding strategic systems based on what it terms “new physical principles” including novel stealth and hypersonic technologies.” Moscow could be preparing to take back some of its former republics that were lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. “At present there is a dangerous combination of paranoia — some of it justified, considering Russia’s history — nationalism, and bitterness at the loss of what many Russians regard as their rightful place as a great power,” it said. “It was just such a mixture, along with a series of unfortunate events that drove Nazi Germany on its ill-thought-out course.”

Contention 2: Nuclear Industry

At the top- the nuclear industry is dying now- this will increase warming- fossil fuels are increasing and renewables are decreasing- but new power plants will thump any nuclear power disads

Tat ’12 (Chee Hong Tat, Chief Executive, Energy Market Authority of Singapore, “Singapore International Market Week Publication”, “SECURING OUR ENERGY FUTURE APRIL 2012”, LEQ)

Nuclear Faces The Long Road Back For the nuclear industry, recovery will depend on turning around public opinion u For the nuclear industry, Fukushima will stand as the fault line dividing two eras. Before the catastrophic events of March 2011, nuclear energy had been reborn as the clean energy of choice, having emerged from decades as the pariah of the energy family. But the earthquake and tsunami that ripped through the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant changed all of that, radically altering the energy landscape. For the atomic energy sector, it will be a long, hard and expensive road back. "Since the Fukushima disaster in Japan, the EU has begun to carry out comprehensive stress tests at its nuclear power plants," European Commissioner for Energy Mr GÜnther Oettinger said in a video pre- recorded for the Singapore International Energy Week (SIEW) 2011. "It [also] aims to put in place the most advanced legal framework for the sustainable use of nuclear energy." If anything, the Fukushima disaster has shown that nuclear power cannot operate in isolation, requiring instead a comprehensive and global approach to safety. "To strengthen nuclear safety world- wide, we would welcome other countries operating nuclear power plants to carry out similar assessments as soon as pos- sible," Mr Oettinger added. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has painted a gloomy picture of a world with what it calls a "low nuclear case". A reduced nuclear output will lead to "increased import bills, heightened energy security concerns, and make it harder and more expensive to combat climate change." In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, Germany, Europe's biggest economy, closed eight of its 17 reactors permanently. It later formally announced plans to shut down its nuclear programme within 11 years. While nuclear has made a muted comeback since Fukushima – the US recently reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear by opening two new nuclear units, the first in 15 years, experts see continuing challenges that will make it very difficult for the nuclear power industry to expand beyond a small handful of reactor projects. China promises that nuclear can be made safer. In particular, its research into safer thorium fuel cycle technology has been applauded by the nuclear lobby. Despite this, experts say nuclear programmes worldwide are set to contract rather than expand. The low nuclear case foresees the total amount of nuclear power capacity fall- ing from 393GW at the end of 2010 to 335GW in 2035, a little more than half the levels previously set out in IEA's New Policies Scenario. New Policies Scenario The share of nuclear power in total gen- eration will drop from 13 per cent in 2010 to just seven per cent in 2035, with implications for energy security, diversity of the fuel mix, spending on energy imports, and energy-related CO2 emissions. "It is clear now that without nuclear, we cannot meet CO2 reduction targets," said IEA's former Executive Director, Mr Nobuo Tanaka, when he opened SIEW 2011 with his keynote lecture. Or, as the agency’s Chief Economist, Dr Fatih Birol, posits – make power in general "viciously more expensive" and close the door to 2°C forever. A shift away from nuclear power "would definitely be bad news for energy security, for climate change and also for the eco- A shift away from nuclear power would definitely be bad news for energy security, for climate change, and also for the economics of the electricity price nomics of the electricity price," he added. Research into small modular reactors (SMR) is still in its infancy although the reduced cost of a 10MW modular unit that could power about 7,000 homes, compared with the one million homes from a conven- tional reactor, is receiving attention. ThE EvEr- ShriNkiNG piE The drastically-altered landscape can be seen in IEA projections for nuclear. Under its 2010 outlook, there was to be a 90 per cent increase in nuclear capacity. This compares with its latest projection of 60 per cent for the same period from 2011. While there will now be heavy reliance on the lighter emissions of gas to meet green house targets, the nuclear disaster has been an unexpected fillip for the renewables and alternative energy sector. The rise was driven by the solar power industry, where the value of transac- tions jumped by 56 per cent to $15.8 billion, to account for almost one-third of take-overs, according to advisory firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. Nevertheless, analysts say any surge in renewable energy is likely to be eclipsed by a return to coal, with a powerfully negative effect on CO2 emissions. Even before the Japanese earthquake, the nuclear industry was struggling. Weak power demand due to the reces-sion and cheaper alternatives such as gas and coal made it difficult to justify the hefty investment in reactors. Only those plants with strong government backing were going ahead. With nuclear-agnostic countries dropping plans for civil nuclear indus- tries, China remains the last hope of the beleaguered sector. While China froze approvals of new nuclear plants follow- ing Fukushima, it has already restarted its programme and the country is set to dominate the nuclear landscape. The PRC's 2020 target of reaching 80,000MW of nuclear capacity, from 10,000MW last year, may have been reduced due to delays caused by Fukush- ima. Nevertheless, its ambitious projects are putting most of the other countries' nuclear plans in the shade. Meanwhile, other emerging econo- mies, including India and the United Arab Emirates, are also planning signifi- cant investments in new reactors. Nuclear’s share of electricity generation is also likely to slip as other forms of generation grow more quickly. In the developed world, the emphasis is on finding alternatives to nuclear power. In Japan, which derived some 30 per cent of its electricity from nuclear power plants prior to Fukushima, efforts to regain public support for restarting the re- actors have made little headway. Since the tsunami, 52 out of the nation's 54 reactors have been offline as of March 2012. One important litmus of the industry's health has been companies that service the nuclear energy marketplace. They, too, have been repositioning themselves in an increasingly unattractive market. Shaw, the US civil engineering com- pany, has sold its 20 per cent stake in nuclear engineering group Westinghouse Electric Company to Toshiba of Japan. Toshiba, for its part, plans to sell the holding to another investor. General Electric, the US industrial group that is one of the world's lead- ing nuclear engineers through its joint venture with Hitachi of Japan, has said it does not hold out much hope for market growth in the immediate future. It now expects nuclear power to decline in importance as other parts of the business grow more rapidly. New Lesson: Getting More From Less What is emerging is that the nuclear sector is trying to eke more power out of existing plants and applying new technol- ogies to extend the lives of ageing reactors. In the US, 60 reactors have been given approval to have their working lives extended from 40 to 60 years. The capac- ity of existing nuclear plants is being increased. Since 1977, regulators have approved 139 upgrades in the US, adding about 6,000MW to the capacity of the US reactor fleet. Mr John Rowe, Chief Executive of Exelon, the largest US nuclear generator, has argued that these life extensions and modifications are a much more cost-ef- fective way of investing in nuclear power. Other countries, including Spain, Sweden and Finland, have also allowed significant upgrades. Lightbridge, a US nuclear fuels company, is offering a new type of metallic nuclear fuel. It claims this can increase output on an existing reactor by up to 17 per cent. Malaysia's Tan Sri Leo Moggie, Chairman of Tenaga Nasional Bhd, has said that proponents who point to the fact that Fukushima was an old plant with an outdated reactor that was soon to be decommissioned, are floundering in the face of the opposition ranged against nuclear power. Arguments that nuclear power is the only viable technology which can address issues of global warming and climate change ring hollow when faced with contrary public opinion. "The supporters of nuclear power will also point out that as a result of Fukushima, there will be more stringent regulatory rules and all design crite- ria are going to be further tightened," he said in his public lecture at the Singapore Energy Market Author- ity's (EMA) inaugural Distinguished Speaker Programme last April. "The challenge, post-Fukushima, however, is not strictly technical but one of public acceptance. "With all the images of the Fuku- shima nuclear plant meltdown fresh in their minds, together with footage of what happened in Chernobyl as Ukraine commemorated the 25th anniversary of the tragedy, it is unlikely that, at least in the short term, public opinion can be persuaded to support the use of nuclear power," he shared with audiences. For the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, like their European counterparts which have factored in nuclear as part of their energy generation mix, Fukushima will mean revisiting those plans. "It will also encourage pressure of public opinion for governments and utilities worldwide to focus more on the development of renewable energy and green energy technologies," Tan Sri Moggie said. If nuclear is to have a future, govern- ments will need to be cognisant of the cross-border impact of nuclear energy and for increased international co-opera- tion requiring it to maintain the highest safety, security, non-proliferation and environmental protection standards for nuclear generation. Of utmost importance, say policymak- ers, is the need to develop a common legislative framework with respect to the safety of nuclear installations and the management of spent fuel and radioac- tive waste. ■ Despite this, the limits of the extra power that can be squeezed out by these modifications are now being reached. public opiNioN ThE kEy Ultimately, the future of nuclear power lies not with the sector's companies or even with the governments that bankroll the projects, but with public opinion. Attitudes in Japan have hardened towards nuclear power. A year after the accident, anger against TEPCO and complacent government overseers runs deep in Fukushima and among a wider public who had been promised that Japan's nuclear plants were safe against the seismic misfortunes that plague Japan. Post-Fukushima polls suggest that somewhere between 41 and 54 per cent of Japanese support scrapping, or reduc- ing the numbers of nuclear power plants. The battle to win public acceptance will be crucial to the future of nuclear energy.

The plan solves-

SMR’s are the vital internal link into jump-starting the dormant US nuclear industry- DOD action is key to overcome market barriers and eliminate the stigma surrounding nuclear energy

Loudermilk and Andres ’10 (Richard B. Andres is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University and a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Micah J. Loudermilk is a researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Reactors and the Military's Role in Securing America's Nuclear Industry”, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/100823646-small-reactors-and-the-militar.htm, April 23, 2010, LEQ)

Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a renewed push for clean energy, the stage is set for a vibrant revival of the nuclear power industry in the United States. During his 2008 campaign, President Barack Obama committed to setting the country on the road to a clean, secure, and independent energy future - and nuclear power can play a vital role in that. With abundant energy resources available and near-zero emission levels, nuclear power offers a domestically-generated, clean, and long-term solution to America's energy dilemma. While countries around the world are building new reactors though, the U.S. nuclear power industry has remained dormant - and even borders on extinction - as no new plants have been approved for construction in the more than three decades following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Although Congress and the Executive Branch have passed laws and issued proclamations over the years, little actual progress has been made in the nuclear energy realm. A number of severe obstacles face any potential entrant into the reactor market - namely the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which lacks the budget and manpower necessary to seriously address nuclear power expansion. Additionally, public skepticism over the safety of nuclear power plants has impeded serious attempts at new plant construction. However, despite the hurdles facing private industry, the U.S. military is in a position to take a leading role in the advancement of nuclear reactor technology through the integration of small reactors on its domestic bases. While the Obama Administration has pledged $8 billion in federal loan guarantees to the construction of two new reactors in Georgia and an additional $36 billion in new guarantees to the nuclear industry, this comes on top of $18.5 billion budgeted, but unspent, dollars. Despite this aid, it is still improbable that the U.S. will see any new large reactors now or in the foreseeable future as enormous cost, licensing, construction, and regulatory hurdles must be overcome. In recent years though, attention in the nuclear energy sphere has turned in a new direction: small-scale reactors. These next-generation reactors seek to revolutionize the nuclear power industry and carry a host of benefits that both separate them from their larger cousins and provide a legitimate opportunity to successfully reinvigorate the American nuclear industry. When compared to conventional reactors, small reactors have a number of advantages. First, the reactors are both small and often scalable - meaning that sites can be configured to house one to multiple units based on power needs. Although they only exist on paper and the military has yet to embrace a size or design, the companies investing in these technologies are examining a range of possibilities. Hyperion, for example, is working on a so-called "nuclear battery" - a 25 MWe sealed and transportable unit the size of a hot tub. Similarly, Babcock & Wilcox - the company which built many of the Navy's reactors - is seeking licensing for its mPower reactor, which is scalable and produces 125 MWe of power per unit. Other designs, such as Westinghouse's International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) model, have a generating capacity of up to 335 MWe. Second, large reactors come with enormous price tags - often approaching $10 billion in projected costs. The costs associated with building new reactors are so astronomical that few companies can afford the capital outlay to finance them. Additionally, the risks classically associated with the construction of nuclear reactors serve as an additional deterrent to interested utilities. As a result, companies must be willing to accept significant financial risks since ventures could potentially sink them or result in credit downgrades - as evidenced by the fact that 40 of 48 utilities issuing debt to nuclear projects suffered downgrades following the accident at Three Mile Island. All of this adds up to an environment that is not conducive to the sponsorship of new reactor plants. On the other hand, small reactors are able to mostly circumvent the cost hurdles facing large reactors. During the construction of large reactors, utilities face "single-shaft risk" - forced to invest and tie up billions of dollars in a single plant. However, small reactors present the opportunity for utilities to buy and add reactor capacity as needed or in a step-by-step process, as opposed to an all-or-nothing approach. Small reactors are also factory-constructed and shipped, not custom-designed projects, and can be built and installed in half the time - all of which are cost-saving measures. Additionally, despite concerns from critics over the proliferation and safety risks that a cadre of small reactors would potentially pose, the reality is considerably different. On the safety side, the new designs boast a number of features - including passive safety measures and simpler designs, thus reducing the number of systems to monitor and potential for system failure, enhancing the safety of the reactors. Small reactors can often be buried underground, are frequently fully contained and sealed (complete with a supply of fuel inside), can run longer between refueling cycles, and feature on-site waste storage - all of which serve to further insulate and secure the units. Finally, due to their small size, the reactors do not require the vast water resources needed by large reactors and in the event of an emergency, are far easier to isolate, shut off, and cool down if necessary. Notwithstanding all of these benefits, with a difficult regulation environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, and skeptical public opinion, the nuclear energy industry faces an uphill - and potentially unwinnable - battle in the quest for new reactors in the United States. Left to its own devices it is unlikely, at best, that private industry will succeed in bringing new reactors to the U.S. on its own. However, a route exists by which small reactors could potentially become a viable energy option: the U.S. military. Since 1948, the U.S. Navy has deployed over 500 reactors and possesses a perfect safety record in managing them. At the same time, grave concern exists over the fact that U.S. military bases are tied to and entirely dependent upon the civilian electric grid - from which they receive 99% of their power. Recently, attention has turned to the fact that the civilian grid, in addition to accidents, is vulnerable to cyber or terrorist attacks. In the event of a deliberate attack on the United States that knocks out all or part of the electric grid, the assets housed at the affected bases would be unavailable and U.S. global military operations potentially jeopardized. The presence of small-scale nuclear reactors on U.S. military bases would enable these facilities to effectively become "islands" - insulating them from the civilian grid and even potentially deterring attacks if the opponent knows that the military network would be unaffected. Unlike private industry, the military does not face the same regulatory and congressional hurdles to constructing reactors and would have an easier time in adopting them for use. By integrating small nuclear reactors as power sources for domestic U.S. military bases, three potential energy dilemmas are solved at the same time. First, by incorporating small reactors at its bases, the military addresses its own energy security quandary. The military has recently sought to "island" its bases in the U.S. -protecting them from grid outages, be they accidental or intentional. The Department of Defense has promoted this endeavor through lowering energy consumption on bases and searching for renewable power alternatives, but these measures alone will prove insufficient. Small reactors provide sufficient energy output to power military installations and in some cases surrounding civilian population centers. Secondly, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, the stigma on the nuclear power industry will ease and inroads will be created for the adoption of small-scale reactors as a viable source of energy. Private industry and the public will see that nuclear reactors can indeed be utilized safely and effectively, resulting in a renewed push toward the expansion of nuclear power. Although many of the same hurdles will still be in place, a shift in public opinion and a stronger effort by utilities, coupled with the demonstrated success of small reactors on military bases, could prove the catalysts necessary for the federal government and the NRC to take more aggressive action. Finally, while new reactors are not likely in the near future, the military's actions will preserve, for a while longer, the badly ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. Nuclear power is here to stay around the globe, and the United States has an opportunity to take a leading role in supplying the world's nuclear energy and reactor technology. With the U.S. nuclear industry dormant for three decades, much of the attention, technology, and talent have concentrated overseas in countries with a strong interest in nuclear technology. Without the United States as a player in the nuclear energy market, it has little say over safety regulations of reactors or the potential risks of proliferation from the expansion of nuclear energy. If the current trend continues, the U.S. will reach a point where it is forced to import nuclear technology and reactors from other countries. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will both guarantee the survival of the American nuclear industry in the short term, and work to solidify support for it in the long run. Ultimately, between small-scale nuclear reactors and the U.S. military, the capability exists to revitalize America's sleeping nuclear industry and promoting energy security and clean energy production. The reactors offer the ability to power domestic military bases, small towns, and other remote locations detached from the energy grid. Furthermore, reactor sites can house multiple units, allowing for greater energy production - rivaling even large reactors. Small reactors offer numerous benefits to the United States and a path initiated by the military presents a realistic route by which their adoption can be achieved.

SMR’s would kick-start a global nuclear revival- that’s key to solve global warming- all other alternative energies will fail

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah K. Loudermilk, Contributor Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, contracted through ASE Inc, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs”, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375, May 31, 2011, LEQ)

Economies of Scale Reversed? Safety aside, one of the biggest issues associated with reactor construction is their enormous costs—often approaching up to $10 billion apiece. The outlay costs associated with building new reactors are so astronomical that few companies can afford the capital required to finance them. Additionally, during the construction of new reactors, a multi-year process, utilities face “single-shaft risk”—forced to tie up billions of dollars in a single plant with no return on investment until it is complete and operational. When this is coupled with the risks and difficulties classically associated with reactor construction, the resulting environment is not conducive to the sponsorship of new plants. Conventional wisdom says that SMRs cannot be cost-competitive with large reactors due to the substantial economies of scale loss transitioning down from gigawatt-sized reactors to ones producing between 25MW and 300 MW, but, a closer examination may result in a different picture. To begin with, one of the primary benefits of SMRs is their modularity. Whereas conventional reactors are all custom-designed projects and subsequently often face massive cost overruns, SMRs are factory-constructed—in half the time of a large reactor—making outlay costs largely fixed. Moreover, due to their scalability, SMRs at a multi-unit site can come online as installed, rather than needing to wait for completion of the entire project, bringing a faster return on invested capital and allowing for capacity additions as demand increases over time. Other indirect cost-saving measures further increase the fiscal viability of small nuclear reactors. Due to the immense power output of conventional reactors, they also require special high-power transmission lines. In contrast, small reactor output is low enough to use existing transmission lines without overloading them. This allows for small reactors to serve as “drop-in” replacements at existing old fossil fuel-based power plants, while utilizing the transmission lines, steam turbines, and other infrastructure already in place. In fact, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) hopes to acquire two Babcock & Wilcox small reactors for use in this manner—perhaps precipitating a movement whereby numerous fossil fuel plants could be converted. Lastly, and often ignored, is the ability of small reactors to bring a secure energy supply to locations detached from the grid. Small communities across Canada, Alaska, and other places have expressed immense interest in this opportunity. Additionally, the incorporation of small reactors may be put to productive use in energy-intensive operations including the chemical and plastics industries, oil refineries, and shale gas extraction. Doing so, especially in the fossil fuels industry would free up the immense amounts of oil and gas currently burned in the extraction and refining process. All told, small reactors possess numerous direct and indirect cost benefits which may alter thinking on the monetary competitiveness of the technology. Nuclear vs. Alternatives: a realistic picture When discussing the energy security contributions offered by small nuclear reactors, it is not enough to simply compare them with existing nuclear technology, but also to examine how they measure up against other electricity generation alternatives—renewable energy technologies and fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and oil currently account for 45%, 23% and 1% respectively of US electricity generation sources. Hydroelectric power accounts for 7%, and other renewable power sources for 4%. These ratios are critical to remember because idealistic visions of providing for US energy security are not as useful as realistic ones balancing the role played by fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. Limitations of renewables Renewable energy technologies have made great strides forward during the last decade. In an increasingly carbon emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) aware global commons, the appeal of solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources is strong, and many countries are moving to increase their renewable electricity generation. However, despite massive expansion on this front, renewable sources struggle to keep pace with increasing demand, to say nothing of decreasing the amount of energy obtained from other sources. The continual problem with solar and wind power is that, lacking efficient energy storage mechanisms, it is difficult to contribute to baseload power demands. Due to the intermittent nature of their energy production, which often does not line up with peak demand usage, electricity grids can only handle a limited amount of renewable energy sources—a situation which Germany is now encountering. Simply put, nuclear power provides virtually carbon-free baseload power generation, and renewable options are unable to replicate this, especially not on the scale required by expanding global energy demands. Small nuclear reactors, however, like renewable sources, can provide enhanced, distributed, and localized power generation. As the US moves towards embracing smart grid technologies, power production at this level becomes a critical piece of the puzzle. Especially since renewable sources, due to sprawl, are of limited utility near crowded population centers, small reactors may in fact prove instrumental to enabling the smart grid to become a reality. Pursuing a carbon-free world Realistically speaking, a world without nuclear power is not a world full of increased renewable usage, but rather, of fossil fuels instead. The 2007 Japanese Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear outage is an excellent example of this, as is Germany’s post-Fukushima decision to shutter its nuclear plants, which, despite immense development of renewable options, will result in a heavier reliance on coal-based power as its reactors are retired, leading to a 4% increase in annual carbon emissions. On the global level, without nuclear power, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation would rise nearly 20% from nine to eleven billion tons per year. When examined in conjunction with the fact that an estimated 300,000 people per year die as a result of energy-based pollutants, the appeal of nuclear power expansion grows further. As the world copes simultaneously with burgeoning power demand and the need for clean energy, nuclear power remains the one consistently viable option on the table. With this in mind, it becomes even more imperative to make nuclear energy as safe as possible, as quickly as possible—a capacity which SMRs can fill with their high degree of safety and security. Additionally, due to their modular nature, SMRs can be quickly constructed and deployed widely. While this is not to say that small reactors should supplant large ones, the US would benefit from diversification and expansion of the nation’s nuclear energy portfolio. Path forward: Department of Defense as first-mover Problematically, despite the immense energy security benefits that would accompany the wide-scale adoption of small modular reactors in the US, with a difficult regulatory environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, skeptical public opinion, and of course the recent Fukushima accident, the nuclear industry faces a tough road in the battle for new reactors. While President Obama and Energy Secretary Chu have demonstrated support for nuclear advancement on the SMR front, progress will prove difficult. However, a potential route exists by which small reactors may more easily become a reality: the US military. The US Navy has successfully managed, without accident, over 500 small reactors on-board its ships and submarines throughout 50 years of nuclear operations. At the same time, serious concern exists, highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2008, that US military bases are tied to, and almost entirely dependent upon, the fragile civilian electrical grid for 99% of its electricity consumption. To protect military bases’ power supplies and the nation’s military assets housed on these domestic installations, the Board recommended a strategy of “islanding” the energy supplies for military installations, thus ensuring their security and availability in a crisis or conflict that disrupts the nation’s grid or energy supplies. DOD has sought to achieve this through decreased energy consumption and renewable technologies placed on bases, but these endeavors will not go nearly far enough in achieving the department’s objectives. However, by placing small reactors on domestic US military bases, DOD could solve its own energy security quandary—providing assured supplies of secure and constant energy both to bases and possibly the surrounding civilian areas as well. Concerns over reactor safety and security are alleviated by the security already present on installations and the military’s long history of successfully operating nuclear reactors without incident. Unlike reactors on-board ships, small reactors housed on domestic bases would undoubtedly be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation and certification, however, with strong military backing, adoption of the reactors may prove significantly easier than would otherwise be possible. Additionally, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, general fears over the use and expansion of nuclear power will ease, creating inroads for widespread adoption of the technology at the private utility level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, action by DOD as a “first mover” on small reactor technology will preserve America’s badly struggling and nearly extinct nuclear energy industry. The US possesses a wealth of knowledge and technological expertise on SMRs and has an opportunity to take a leading role in its adoption worldwide. With the domestic nuclear industry largely dormant for three decades, the US is at risk of losing its position as the global leader in the international nuclear energy market. If the current trend continues, the US will reach a point in the future where it is forced to import nuclear technologies from other countries—a point echoed by Secretary Chu in his push for nuclear power expansion. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will guarantee the short-term survival of the US nuclear industry and will work to solidify long-term support for nuclear energy. Conclusions In the end, small modular reactors present a viable path forward for both the expansion of nuclear power in the US and also for enhanced US energy security. Offering highly safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant designs, SMRs have the potential to bring carbon-free baseload distributed power across the United States. Small reactors measure up with, and even exceed, large nuclear reactors on questions of safety and possibly on the financial (cost) front as well. SMRs carry many of the benefits of both large-scale nuclear energy generation and renewable energy technologies. At the same time, they can reduce US dependence on fossil fuels for electricity production—moving the US ahead on carbon dioxide and GHG reduction goals and setting a global example. While domestic hurdles within the nuclear regulatory environment domestically have proven nearly impossible to overcome since Three Mile Island, military adoption of small reactors on its bases would provide energy security for the nation’s military forces and may create the inroads necessary to advance the technology broadly and eventually lead to their wide-scale adoption.

And SMR’s alone are sufficient to solve emissions- global spillover- the most qualified studies go aff

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created – that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities – if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a fulcrum for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to recapture technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

Now the impacts-

Extinction- tipping point

Dyer ‘12 -- London-based independent journalist, PhD from King's College London, citing UC Berkeley scientists (Gwynne, "Tick, tock to mass extinction date," The Press, 6-19-12, l/n, accessed 8-15-12, mss)

Meanwhile, a team of respected scientists warn that life on Earth may be on the way to an irreversible "tipping point". Sure. Heard that one before, too. Last month one of the world's two leading scientific journals, Nature, published a paper, "Approaching a state shift in Earth's biosphere," pointing out that more than 40 per cent of the Earth's land is already used for human needs. With the human population set to grow by a further two billion by 2050, that figure could soon exceed 50 per cent. "It really will be a new world, biologically, at that point," said the paper's lead author, Professor Anthony Barnofsky of the University of California, Berkeley. But Barnofsky doesn't go into the details of what kind of new world it might be. Scientists hardly ever do in public, for fear of being seen as panic-mongers. Besides, it's a relatively new hypothesis, but it's a pretty convincing one, and it should be more widely understood. Here's how bad it could get. The scientific consensus is that we are still on track for 3 degrees C of warming by 2100, but that's just warming caused by human greenhouse- gas emissions. The problem is that +3 degrees is well past the point where the major feedbacks kick in: natural phenomena triggered by our warming, like melting permafrost and the loss of Arctic sea-ice cover, that will add to the heating and that we cannot turn off. The trigger is actually around 2C (3.5 degrees F) higher average global temperature. After that we lose control of the process: ending our own carbon- dioxide emissions would no longer be enough to stop the warming. We may end up trapped on an escalator heading up to +6C (+10.5F), with no way of getting off. And +6C gives you the mass extinction. There have been five mass extinctions in the past 500 million years, when 50 per cent or more of the species then existing on the Earth vanished, but until recently the only people taking any interest in this were paleontologists, not climate scientists. They did wonder what had caused the extinctions, but the best answer they could come up was "climate change". It wasn't a very good answer. Why would a warmer or colder planet kill off all those species? The warming was caused by massive volcanic eruptions dumping huge quantities of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere for tens of thousands of years. But it was very gradual and the animals and plants had plenty of time to migrate to climatic zones that still suited them. (That's exactly what happened more recently in the Ice Age, as the glaciers repeatedly covered whole continents and then retreated again.) There had to be a more convincing kill mechanism than that. The paleontologists found one when they discovered that a giant asteroid struck the planet 65 million years ago, just at the time when the dinosaurs died out in the most recent of the great extinctions. So they went looking for evidence of huge asteroid strikes at the time of the other extinction events. They found none. What they discovered was that there was indeed major warming at the time of all the other extinctions - and that the warming had radically changed the oceans. The currents that carry oxygen- rich cold water down to the depths shifted so that they were bringing down oxygen- poor warm water instead, and gradually the depths of the oceans became anoxic: the deep waters no longer had any oxygen. When that happens, the sulfur bacteria that normally live in the silt (because oxygen is poison to them) come out of hiding and begin to multiply. Eventually they rise all the way to the surface over the whole ocean, killing all the oxygen-breathing life. The ocean also starts emitting enormous amounts of lethal hydrogen sulfide gas that destroy the ozone layer and directly poison land- dwelling species. This has happened many times in the Earth's history.

It will be rapid and quick- extinction

Light 12 (Malcolm, PhD, University of London – Earth science and climate consultant, “Global Extinction within one Human Lifetime as a Result of a Spreading Atmospheric Arctic Methane Heat wave and Surface Firestorm,” http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/p/global-extinction-within-one-human.html)

Although the sudden high rate Arctic methane increase at Svalbard in late 2010 data set applies to only a short time interval, similar sudden methane concentration peaks also occur at Barrow point and the effects of a major methane build-up has been observed using all the major scientific observation systems. Giant fountains/torches/plumes of methane entering the atmosphere up to 1 km across have been seen on the East Siberian Shelf. This methane eruption data is so consistent and aerially extensive that when combined with methane gas warming potentials, Permian extinction event temperatures and methane lifetime data it paints a frightening picture of the beginning of the now uncontrollable global warming induced destabilization of the subsea Arctic methane hydrates on the shelf and slope which started in late 2010. This process of methane release will accelerate exponentially, release huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere and lead to the demise of all life on earth before the middle of this century. Introduction The 1990 global atmospheric mean temperature is assumed to be 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005; NASA, 2002; DATAWeb, 2012) which sets the 2 oC anomaly above which humanity will lose control of her ability to limit the effects of global warming on major climatic and environmental systems at 16.49 oC (IPCC, 2007). The major Permian extinction event temperature is 80 oF (26.66 oC) which is a temperature anomaly of 12.1766 oC above the 1990 global mean temperature of 14.49 oC (Wignall, 2009; Shakil, 2005). Results of Investigation Figure 1 shows a huge sudden atmospheric spike like increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard north of Norway in the Arctic reaching 2040 ppb (2.04 ppm)(ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic - Methane - Emergency - Group.org). The cause of this sudden anomalous increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard has been seen on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf where a recent Russian - U.S. expedition has found widespread, continuous powerful methane seepages into the atmosphere from the subsea methane hydrates with the methane plumes (fountains or torches) up to 1 km across producing an atmospheric methane concentration 100 times higher than normal (Connor, 2011). Such high methane concentrations could produce local temperature anomalies of more than 50 oC at a conservative methane warming potential of 25. Figure 2 is derived from the Svalbard data in Figure 1 and the methane concentration data has been used to generate a Svalbard atmospheric temperature anomaly trend using a methane warming potential of 43.5 as an example. The huge sudden anomalous spike in atmospheric methane concentration in mid August, 2010 at Svalbard is clearly evident and the methane concentrations within this spike have been used to construct a series of radiating methane global warming temperature trends for the entire range of methane global warming potentials in Figure 3 from an assumed mean start temperature of -3.575 degrees Centigrade for Svalbard (see Figure 2) (Norwegian Polar Institute; 2011). Figure 3 shows a set of radiating Arctic atmospheric methane global warming temperature trends calculated from the steep methane atmospheric concentration gradient at Svalbard in 2010 (ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic-Methane-Emergency-Group.org). The range of extinction temperature anomalies above the assumed 1990 mean atmospheric temperature of 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005) are also shown on this diagram as well as the 80 oF (26.66 oC) major Permian extinction event temperature (Wignall, 2009). Sam Carana (pers. com. 7 Jan, 2012) has described large December 2011 (ESRL-NOAA data) warming anomalies which exceed 10 to 20 degrees centigrade and cover vast areas of the Arctic at times. In the centres of these regions, which appear to overlap the Gakkel Ridge and its bounding basins, the temperature anomalies may exceed 20 degrees centigrade. See this site:http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/map/images/fnl/sfctmpmero1a30frames.fnl.anim.html The temperature anomalies in this region of the Arctic for the period from September 8 2011 to October 7, 2011 were only about 4 degrees Centigrade above normal (Carana, pers. com. 2012) and this data set can be seen on this site: http://arctic-newsblogspot.com/p/arctic-temperatures.html Because the Svalbard methane concentration data suggests that the major spike in methane emissions began in late 2010 it has been assumed for calculation purposes that the 2010 temperature anomalies peaked at 4 degrees Centigrade and the 2011 anomalies at 20 degrees Centigrade in the Gakkel Ridge region. The assumed 20 degree Centigrade temperature anomaly trend from 2010 to 2011 in the Gakkel Ridge region requires a methane gas warming potential of about 1000 to generate it from the Svalbard methane atmospheric concentration spike data in 2010. Such high methane warming potentials could only be active over a very short time interval (less than 5.7 months) as shown when the long methane global warming potential lifetimes data from the IPCC (2007; 1992) and Dessus, Laponte and Treut (2008 ) are used to generate a global warming potential growth curve with a methane global warming potential of 100 with a lifespan of 5 years. Because of the high methane global warming potential (1000) of the 2011, 20 oC temperature anomalies in the Gakkel Ridge region, the entire methane global warming potential range from 5 to 1000 has been used to construct the radiating set of temperature trends shown in Figure 3. The 50, 100, 500 and 1000 methane global warming potential (GWP) trends are red and in bold. The choice of a high temperature methane peak with a global warming potential near 1000 is in fact very conservative because the 16 oC increase is assumed to occur over a year. The observed ESRL-NOAA Arctic temperature anomalies varied from 4 to 20 degrees over less than a month in 2011 (Sam Carana, pers. comm. 2012). […] . This very narrow temperature range includes all the mathematically and visually determined extinction times and their means for the northern and southern hemispheres which were calculated quite separately (Figure 7; Table 1). Once the world's ice caps have completely melted away at temperatures above 22.49 oC and times later than 2051.3, the Earth's atmosphere will heat up at an extremely fast rate to reach the Permian extinction event temperature of 80oF (26.66 oC)(Wignall, 2009) by which time all life on Earth will have been completely extinguished. The position where the latent heat of ice melting curve intersects the 8 oC extinction line (22.49 oC) at 2051.3 represents the time when 100 percent of all the ice on the surface of the Earth will have melted. If we make this point on the latent heat of ice melting curve equal to 1 we can determine the time of melting of any fraction of the Earth's icecaps by using the time*temperature function at each time from 2051.3 back to 2015, the time the average Arctic atmospheric temperature curve is predicted to exceed 0 oC. The process of melting 1 kg of ice and heating the produced water up to a certain temperature is a function of the sum of the latent heat of melting of ice is 334 kilo Joules/kg and the final water temperature times the 4.18 kilo Joules/Kg.K (Wikipedia, 2012). This however represents the energy required over a period of one second to melt 1 kg of ice to water and raise it to the ambient temperature. Therefore the total energy per mass of ice over a certain time period is equal to (334 +(4.18*Ambient Temperature)*time in seconds that the melted water took to reach the ambient temperature. From the fractional time*temperature values at each ambient temperature the fractional amounts of melting of the total global icecaps have been calculated and are shown on Figure 9. The earliest calculated fractional volume of melting of the global ice caps in 2016 is 1.85*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice with an average yearly rate of ice melting of 2.557*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice. This value is remarkably similar to, but slightly less than the average rate of melting of the Arctic sea ice measured over an 18 year period of 2.7*10^-3 (1978 to 1995; 2.7% per decade - IPCC 2007).This close correlation between observed rates of Arctic ice cap and predicted rates of global ice cap melting indicates that average rates of Arctic ice cap melting between 1979 and 2015 (which represents the projected time the Arctic will lose its ice cover - Masters, 2009) will be continued during the first few years of melting of the global ice caps after the Arctic ice cover has gone in 2015 as the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature starts to climb above 0 oC. However from 2017 the rate of melting of the global ice will start to accelerate as will the atmospheric temperature until by 2049 it will be more than 9 times as fast as it was around 2015 (Table 2). The mean rate of melting of the global icecap between 2017 and 2049 is some 2*10^-2, some 7.4 times the mean rate of melting of the Arctic ice cap (Table 2). In concert with the increase in rate of global ice cap melting between 2017 and 2049, the acceleration in the rate of melting also increases from 7*10^-4 to 9.9*10^-4 with a mean value close to 8.6*10^-4 (Table 2). The ratio of the acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting to the Arctic ice cap melting increases from 3.4 in 2017 to 4.8 by 2049 with a mean near 4.2. This fast acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting after 2015 compared to the Arctic sea ice cap melting before 2015 is because the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature after 2017 is spiraling upward in temperature above 0 oC adding large amounts of additional energy to the ice and causing it to melt back more quickly. The melt back of the Arctic ice cap is a symptom of the Earth's disease but not its cause and it is the cause that has to be dealt with if we hope to bring about a cure. Therefore a massive cut back in carbon dioxide emissions should be mandatory for all developed nations (and some developing nations as well). Total destruction of the methane in the Arctic atmosphere is also mandatory if we are to survive the effects of its now catastrophic rate of build up in the atmospheric methane concentration However cooling of the Arctic using geoengineering methods is also vitally important to reduce the effects of the ice cap melting further enhancing the already out of control destabilization of the methane hydrates on the Arctic shelf and slope. · Developed (and some developing) countries must cut back their carbon dioxide emissions by a very large percentage (50% to 90%) by 2020 to immediately precipitate a cooling of the Earth and its crust. If this is not done the earthquake frequency and methane emissions in the Arctic will continue to grow exponentially leading to our inexorable demise between 2031 to 2051. · Geoenginering must be used immediately as a cooling method in the Arctic to counteract the effects of the methane buildup in the short term. However these methods will lead to further pollution of the atmosphere in the long term and will not solve the earthquake induced Arctic methane buildup which is going to lead to our annihilation. · The United States and Russia must immediately develop a net of powerful radio beat frequency transmission stations around the Arctic using the critical 13.56 MHZ beat frequency to break down the methane in the stratosphere and troposphere to nanodiamonds and hydrogen (Light 2011a) . Besides the elimination of the high global warming potential methane, the nanodiamonds may form seeds for light reflecting noctilucent clouds in the stratosphere and a light coloured energy reflecting layer when brought down to the Earth by snow and rain (Light 2011a). HAARP transmission systems are able to electronically vibrate the strong ionospheric electric current that feeds down into the polar areas and are thus the least evasive method of directly eliminating the buildup of methane in those critical regions (Light 2011a). The warning about extinction is stark. It is remarkable that global scientists had not anticipated a giant buildup of methane in the atmosphere when it had been so clearly predicted 10 to 20 years ago and has been shown to be critically linked to extinction events in the geological record (Kennett et al. 2003). Furthermore all the experiments should have already been done to determine which geoengineering methods were the most effective in oxidising/destroying the methane in the atmosphere in case it should ever build up to a concentration where it posed a threat to humanity. Those methods need to be applied immediately if there is any faint hope of reducing the catastrophic heating effects of the fast building atmospheric methane concentration.

Contention 3: Solvency

First- the Department of Defense is the key agency to fund Small Modular Reactors- a demonstration project will get the industry off the ground

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

DoD as first Mover Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many un- certainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mo- bility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. How- ever, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities—that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the mar- ketplace.28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense- related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a pre- vailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even ar- gued that small reactors could play a key role in the sec- ond nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leader- ship role now.

DOD needs make or break the solvency of the Affirmative- DOD implementation is vital to get optimal capabilities- this takes out any free market counterplans

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, net- work and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.

SMR’s are an energy game changer- but DOD purchasing agreements are key to just-start the industry and determining optimal configurations

Madia ’12 (William Madia, Stanford Energy Journal, Dr. Madia serves as Chairman of the Board of Overseers and Vice President for the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford University. Previously, he was the Laboratory Director at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from 2000-2004 and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory from 1994-1999., “SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: A POTENTIAL GAME-CHANGING TECHNOLOGY”, http://energyclub.stanford.edu/index.php/Journal/Small_Modular_Reactors_by_William_Madia, Spring 2012, LEQ)

There is a new type of nuclear power plant (NPP) under development that has the potential to be a game changer in the power generation market: the small modular reactor (SMR). Examples of these reactors that are in the 50-225 megawatt electric (MW) range can be found in the designs being developed and advanced by Generation mPower (http://generationmpower.com/), NuScale (http://nuscale.com/), the South Korean SMART reactor (http://smart.kaeri.re.kr/) and Westinghouse (http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/smr/index.htm/). Some SMR concepts are up to 20 times smaller than traditional nuclear plants Today’s reactor designers are looking at concepts that are 5 to 20 times smaller than more traditional gigawatt-scale (GW) plants. The reasons are straightforward; the question is, “Are their assumptions correct?” The first assumption is enhanced safety. GW-scale NPPs require sophisticated designs and cooling systems in case of a total loss of station power, as happened at Fukushima due to the earthquake and tsunami. These ensure the power plant will be able to cool down rapidly enough, so that the nuclear fuel does not melt and release dangerous radioactive fission products and hydrogen gas. SMRs are sized and designed to be able to cool down without any external power or human actions for quite some time without causing damage to the nuclear fuel. The second assumption is economics. GW-scale NPPs cost $6 billion to $10 billion to build. Very few utilities can afford to put this much debt on their balance sheets. SMRs offer the possibility of installing 50-225 MW of power per module at a total cost that is manageable for most utilities. Furthermore, modular configurations allow the utilities to deploy a more tailored power generation capacity, and that capacity can be expanded incrementally. In principle, early modules could be brought on line and begin producing revenues, which could then be used to fund the addition of more modules, if power needs arise. The third assumption is based on market need and fit. Utilities are retiring old fossil fuel plants. Many of them are in the few hundred MW range and are located near load centers and where transmission capacity currently exists. SMRs might be able to compete in the fossil re-power markets where operators don’t need a GW of power to serve their needs. This kind of “plug and play” modality for NPPs is not feasible with many of the current large-scale designs, thus giving carbon-free nuclear power an entry into many of the smaller markets, currently not served by these technologies. There are numerous reasons why SMRs might be viable today. Throughout the history of NPP development, plants grew in size based on classic “economies of scale” considerations. Bigger was cheaper when viewed on a cost per installed kilowatt basis. The drivers that caused the industry to build bigger and bigger NPPs are being offset today by various considerations that make this new breed of SMRs viable. Factory manufacturing is one of these considerations. Most SMRs are small enough to allow them to be factory built and shipped by rail or barge to the power plant sites. Numerous industry “rules of thumb” for factory manufacturing show dramatic savings as compared to “on-site” outdoor building methods. Significant schedule advantages are also available because weather delay considerations are reduced. Of course, from a total cost perspective, some of these savings will be offset by the capital costs associated with building multiple modules to get the same total power output. Based on analyses I have seen, overnight costs in the range of $5000 to $8000 per installed kilowatt are achievable. If these analyses are correct, it means that the economies of scale arguments that drove current designs to GW scales could be countered by the simplicity and factory-build possibilities of SMRs. No one has yet obtained a design certification from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for an SMR, so we must consider licensing to be one of the largest unknowns facing these new designs. Nevertheless, since the most developed of the SMRs are mostly based on proven and licensed components and are configured at power levels that are passively safe, we should not expect many new significant licensing issues to be raised for this class of reactor. Still, the NRC will need to address issues uniquely associated with SMRs, such as the number of reactor modules any one reactor operator can safely operate and the size of the emergency planning zone for SMRs. To determine if SMRs hold the potential for changing the game in carbon-free power generation, it is imperative that we test the design, engineering, licensing, and economic assumptions with some sort of public-private development and demonstration program. Instead of having government simply invest in research and development to “buy down” the risks associated with SMRs, I propose a more novel approach. Since the federal government is a major power consumer, it should commit to being the “first mover” of SMRs. This means purchasing the first few hundred MWs of SMR generation capacity and dedicating it to federal use. The advantages of this approach are straightforward. The government would both reduce licensing and economic risks to the point where utilities might invest in subsequent units, thus jumpstarting the SMR industry. It would then also be the recipient of additional carbon-free energy generation capacity. This seems like a very sensible role for government to play without getting into the heavy politics of nuclear waste, corporate welfare, or carbon taxes. If we want to deploy power generation technologies that can realize near-term impact on carbon emissions safely, reliably, economically, at scale, and at total costs that are manageable on the balance sheets of most utilities, we must consider SMRs as a key component of our national energy strategy.

And a purchase-power agreement solves best- it incentivizes private market action while reducing overhead cost of electricity for the government – creates a win/win- multiple markets exist

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

6.2 GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF MARKET TRANSFORMATION INCENTIVES Similar to other important energy technologies, such as energy storage and renewables, “market pull” activities coupled with the traditional “technology push” activities would significantly increase the likelihood of timely and successful commercialization. Market transformation incentives serve two important objectives. They facilitate demand for the off-take of SMR plants, thus reducing market risk and helping to attract private investment without high risk premiums. In addition, if such market transformation opportunities could be targeted to higher price electricity markets or higher value electricity applications, they would significantly reduce the cost of any companion production incentives. There are three special market opportunities that may provide the additional market pull needed to successfully commercialize SMRs: the federal government, international applications, and the need for replacement of existing coal generation plants. 6.2.1 Purchase Power Agreements with Federal Agency Facilities Federal facilities could be the initial customer for the output of the LEAD or FOAK SMR plants. The federal government is the largest single consumer of electricity in the U.S., but its use of electricity is widely dispersed geographically and highly fragmented institutionally (i.e., many suppliers and customers). Current federal electricity procurement policies do not encourage aggregation of demand, nor do they allow for agencies to enter into long-term contracts that are “bankable” by suppliers. President Obama has sought to place federal agencies in the vanguard of efforts to adopt clean energy technologies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Executive Order 13514, issued on October 5, 2009, calls for reductions in greenhouse gases by all federal agencies, with DOE establishing a target of a 28% reduction by 2020, including greenhouse gases associated with purchased electricity. SMRs provide one potential option to meet the President’s Executive Order. One or more federal agency facilities that can be cost effectively connected to an SMR plant could agree to contract to purchase the bulk of the power output from a privately developed and financed LEAD plant. 46 A LEAD plant, even without the benefits of learning, could offer electricity to federal facilities at prices competitive with the unsubsidized significant cost of other clean energy technologies. Table 4 shows that the LCOE estimates for the LEAD and FOAK-1plants are in the range of the unsubsidized national LCOE estimates for other clean electricity generation technologies (based on the current state of maturity of the other technologies). All of these technologies should experience additional learning improvements over time. However, as presented earlier in the learning model analysis, the study team anticipates significantly greater learning improvements in SMR technology that would improve the competitive position of SMRs over time. Additional competitive market opportunities can be identified on a region-specific, technology-specific basis. For example, the Southeast U.S. has limited wind resources. While the region has abundant biomass resources, the estimated unsubsidized cost of biomass electricity is in the range of $90-130 per MWh (9-13¢/kWh), making LEAD and FOAK plants very competitive (prior to consideration of subsidies). 47 Competitive pricing is an important, but not the sole, element to successful SMR deployment. A bankable contractual arrangement also is required, and this provides an important opportunity for federal facilities to enter into the necessary purchase power arrangements. However, to provide a “bankable” arrangement to enable the SMR project sponsor to obtain private sector financing, the federal agency purchase agreement may need to provide a guaranteed payment for aggregate output, regardless of actual generation output. 48 Another challenge is to establish a mechanism to aggregate demand among federal electricity consumers if no single federal facility customer has a large enough demand for the output of an SMR module. The study team believes that highlevel federal leadership, such as that exemplified in E.O. 13514, can surmount these challenges and provide critical initial markets for SMR plants.

Government intervention sparks learning benefits of projects - this overcomes any economic barriers- absent purchasing agreements though SMR’s will fail

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

As illustrated in the previous discussion, until significant learning benefits are achieved, the LEAD SMR plant and some number of FOAK SMR plants may not be competitive with new natural gas combined-cycle generation. Estimates of the number of SMR modules that may not be competitive and the magnitude of the difference in cost are subject to significant uncertainty. The estimates are dependent upon at least three key variables: the initial cost estimates for the LEAD SMR design, the learning rate, and the future price of natural gas. The potential range of uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 4, which identifies the generation cost differential ($/MWh) between the family of SMR plants (LEAD, FOAK, and NOAK) and gas-fired plants for a variety of natural gas price scenarios. This analysis adopts the 10% learning assumption and the overnight cost estimate of $4,700/kW. If natural gas prices remain indefinitely depressed, these scenarios are unlikely to materialize, and the gaps will be significantly higher for the entire family of SMR plants.24 Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace, as the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive. Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit. However, the combination of the large upfront capital investment, the long period before a return on capital may be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on investment make it unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive. The present analysis assumes that government incentives will be essential to bridging this gap and accelerating private sector investment (see Appendix D). It is the study team’s understanding that DOE has proposed to share the cost of certain SMR design and licensing study activities. This section analyzes possible options for government incentives for early deployments (LEAD and FOAK plants) in addition to federal cost sharing for the design and licensing effort. The present analysis considers several alternative approaches to providing such incentives, either in the form of direct or indirect government financial incentives, or through market transformation actions that will spur demand for FOAK plants in competitive applications. The study team’s approach is to identify targeted, least-cost incentives that could form the basis for further dialogue between stakeholders and policy makers. Possible financial incentives need to be designed and evaluated relative to a particular management model for deployment of LEAD and FOAK plants. The study team’s management model assumes that these initial SMR plants will be managed and financed by the private sector, consisting of a possible consortium of the SMR vendor, the reactor module manufacturer, other major vendors, a host-site utility company, and one or more other electricity generation or vertically integrated utilities. The types of incentives that could be structured for this type of management model are discussed in the subsections that follow.

Nuclear Industry 1AC

Contention 1: Inherency

The DOE spent 450 million dollars on SMR’s this year and Obama has taken credit- takes out any perception or funding disads

Energy.gov ’12 (Energy.gov, “Obama Administration Announces $450 Million to Design and Commercialize U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, http://energy.gov/articles/obama-administration-announces-450-million-design-and-commercialize-us-small-modular, March 22, 2012, LEQ)

Obama Administration Announces $450 Million to Design and Commercialize U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors. Today, as President Obama went to Ohio State University to discuss the all-out, all-of-the-above strategy for American energy, the White House announced new funding to advance the development of American-made small modular reactors (SMRs), an important element of the President’s energy strategy. A total of $450 million will be made available to support first-of-its-kind engineering, design certification and licensing for up to two SMR designs over five years, subject to congressional appropriations. Manufacturing these reactors domestically will offer the United States important export opportunities and will advance our competitive edge in the global clean energy race. Small modular reactors, which are approximately one-third the size of current nuclear plants, have compact, scalable designs that are expected to offer a host of safety, construction and economic benefits. “The Obama Administration and the Energy Department are committed to an all-of-the-above energy strategy that develops every source of American energy, including nuclear power, and strengthens our competitive edge in the global clean energy race,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. “Through the funding for small modular nuclear reactors announced today, the Energy Department and private industry are working to position America as the leader in advanced nuclear energy technology and manufacturing.” Through cost-share agreements with private industry, the Department will solicit proposals for promising SMR projects that have the potential to be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and achieve commercial operation by 2022. These cost-share agreements will span a five-year period and, subject to congressional appropriations, will provide a total investment of approximately $900 million, with at least 50 percent provided by private industry. SMRs can be made in factories and transported to sites where they would be ready to “plug and play” upon arrival, reducing both capital costs and construction times. The smaller size also makes SMRs ideal for small electric grids and for locations that cannot support large reactors, offering utilities the flexibility to scale production as demand changes. Today’s announcement builds on the Obama Administration’s efforts to help jumpstart America’s nuclear energy industry that include: · In 2010, the Department signed a conditional commitment for $8 billion in loan guarantees to support the Vogtle project, where the Southern Company and Georgia Power are building two new nuclear reactors, helping to create new jobs and export opportunities for American workers and businesses. · The Energy Department has also supported the Vogtle project and the development of the next generation of nuclear reactors by providing more than $200 million through a cost-share agreement to support the licensing reviews for Westinghouse’s AP1000 reactor design certification. The Vogtle license is the first for new nuclear power plant construction in more than three decades. · Promoting a sustainable nuclear industry in the U.S. also requires cultivating the next generation of scientists and engineers. Over the past three years, the Department has invested $170 million in research grants at more than 70 universities, supporting R&D into a full spectrum of technologies, from advanced reactor concepts to enhanced safety design.

And DOD is performing 50 energy demonstrations now

Sarewitz et al ’12 (Daniel Sarewitz and Samuel Thernstrom Co-Directors, John Alic Technical Consultant, and Writer Travis Doom Research Assistant, A joint project of CSPO and CATF, We are grateful for their time and their insights. Fred Beach Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Texas at Austin William Bonvillian Washington Office Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hanna Breetz PhD Candidate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Kay Sullivan Faith Graduate Fellow, RAND Erica Fuchs Assistant Professor of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University Ken Gabriel Deputy Director, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Anthony Galasso Director of Advanced Integration Capabilities, Boeing Phantom Works David Garman Consultant Eugene Gholz Associate Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin Sherri Goodman Senior Vice President, Center for Naval Analysis Kevin Hurst Assistant Director for Energy R&D, Office of Science and Technology Policy John Jennings Deputy Director for Innovation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Todd Laporte Professor of Political Science, University of California Berkley George Lea Military Branch Chief, Engineering and Construction, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sasha Mackler Bipartisan Policy Center Jeffrey Marqusee Executive Director, SERDP and ESTCP, U.S. Department of Defense William McQuaid Liaison for DoD Energy Conservation Programs, Office of Management and Budget Srini Mirmira Commercialization, Advance Research Projects Agency-Energy Dorothy Robyn Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment Richard Van Atta Institute for Defense Analyses Andrew Wiedlea Defense Threat Reduction Agency Aubrey Wigner Graduate Student, Arizona State University Project Staff and Affiliates Daniel Sarewitz Co-Director, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Samuel Thernstrom Senior Climate Policy Advisor, Clean Air Task Force John Alic Consultant Travis Doom Program Specialist, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Joseph Chaisson Research and Technical Director, Clean Air Task Force Armond Cohen Executive Director, Clean Air Task Force Nate Gorence Associate Director for Energy Innovation, Bipartisan Policy Center Suzanne Landtiser Graphic Designer, Fine Line Studio, “Energy Innovation At The Department Of Defense Assessing The Opportunities”, March 2012, LEQ)

DoD began the Installation Energy Test Bed as a pilot program in 2009 with $20 million in funds from the Stimulus Act. Seeing the value of these demonstrations, in 2010 the Department directed $30 million from the Energy Conservation Investment Program, a flexible military construction budget line, to ESTCP to continue the test bed. For FY2012, the President’s budget proposes $30 million in RDT&E funds for the test bed. ESTCP has successfully piloted the test bed over the last two years. Each year, ESTCP has invited private firms, universities, and government labs to identify emerging technologies that would meet DoD installation needs. The response from industry has been extremely strong: many of the ongoing demonstrations are viewed as critical elements in the business plans of both large and small companies seeking to bring their technologies to full commercialization and widespread deployment. In 2010, ESTCP received more than 300 proposals from leading corporations in the building energy sector, small start-ups with venture capital funding, and the major DOE labs. The proposals were reviewed by teams made up of technical experts from inside and outside of DoD, as well as service representatives familiar with the installations’ needs. Winning proposals (about 15 percent of the total submitted) were then matched up with a service and an installation at which to demonstrate the technology. ESTCP expected some of the early projects to begin to show results in late 2011. The most recent solicitation closed in late March 2011; ESTCP received 600 preproposals whose combined requested funds were over a billion dollars. The timing for an energy test bed is ideal, which is one reason the response from industry has been so strong. The federal government is investing significant resources in building energy R&D, largely through the Department of Energy, and the private sector is making even larger investments, as evidenced by the growth of venture capital backing for “clean tech.” As a structured demonstration program linked to the large DoD market, the ESTCP test bed can leverage these resources for the military’s benefit. The test bed program carries out demonstrations in three broad technical areas: energy component technologies, both for efficiency and generation; system approaches to building energy control, management, and decision making; and installation-level smart-microgrid technologies. Component Technologies The test bed program demonstrates and evaluates advanced component technologies for both demand reduction and distributed generation—technologies that, due to real or perceived risks, are not being used across DoD. The value of these technologies is very cost sensitive: a new component must provide equal or better performance while reducing life-cycle costs. Life-cycle costs are highly sensitive to a number of factors, including the technology’s operational efficiency, its maintenance costs, and the component’s life expectancy. For technologies that appear particularly promising, ESTCP shoulders the cost of first implementation, feeds information back to the developers, and stimulates the adoption of technologies that have been shown to be cost-effective. This also saves DoD the expense of having costly mistakes repeated at individual installations. One example of DoD’s approach is the pilot program currently testing building integrated photo voltaic (BIPV) technologies. BIPV technologies are commercially available and could be deployed on thousands of DoD flat roofs; they could be installed during required roof replacements in place of a traditional roof, providing both a protective roof and a source of energy. Currently, however, neither the Army Corps of Engineers nor the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) includes BIPV as a roofing option, because neither has data on the performance of the technology. The pilot program is collecting detailed data on the performance of BIPV along multiple criteria. NAVFAC leads this project in collaboration with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Systems Approaches to Energy Control and Management Although individual component technologies are important, the largest potential payoff lies in the opportunities to integrate technologies throughout a building and across an entire installation. Unlike other DoD platforms, such as aircraft and ships, buildings and installations have not been designed or maintained with a systems perspective. They are complex entities with many nonlinear interactions that affect energy flows and operations. A systems approach is needed to optimize performance for individual buildings and building clusters within an installation. Systems approaches will focus on new design tools and the exploitation of distributed sensors linked to innovative control strategies. In addition to the impediments to commercialization discussed above, systems approaches face another major obstacle: the lack of real-world testing, particularly in the retrofit market, where DoD has the greatest interest. DoD has a unique opportunity in this area due to the nature of its installations and the unique security concerns associated with information assurance that a demonstration must address. For example, the pilot program is testing an innovative approach to “continuous building commissioning.” Over time, the energy performance of buildings degrades; most buildings rarely meet their design intent, much less perform optimally. Advances in monitoring and modeling tools now make it possible to continuously optimize building performance. Two pilot projects demonstrating a whole-building monitoring system are assessing its ability to do the following: 1) Identify, classify, and quantify deviations from design intent or optimal performance regarding consumption of energy and water in the building; 2) Classify and identify the root causes of such deviation; 3) Identify corrective actions; and 4) Quantify the value of these actions in terms of energy and water savings and other economic benefits. Project participants include United Technologies Research Center (lead), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the University of California at Berkeley, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Smart-Microgrid Technologies In addition to demand reduction and increased distributed energy generation, DoD’s energy security goal requires the deployment of smart-microgrid technologies that allow DoD installations to “island” and provide operational capability in the event of grid failure. These same technologies offer DoD opportunities to reduce operational costs through demand response management. DoD’s requirement for this class of technology puts it in a unique position: although DoD has security concerns not found in the private sector, it expects to use commercial smart-grid technologies in the future, rather than developing its own solutions. Standards and smart-grid technologies are expected to change significantly in the coming years; DoD should not adopt an approach that is independent of, or inconsistent with, the changing commercial market. The test bed program will demonstrate emerging commercial technologies configured to meet DoD’s unique security needs, and evaluate the critical operational and information security issues related to the use of these technologies. For example, the pilot program is currently testing a General Electric smart-microgrid technology at the Marine Corps’ Twentynine Palms installation in California. The technology is designed to manage and control the complicated interactions among heat and electrical power generation, power demand, energy storage, and power distribution and delivery. It can also optimize energy usage, and offers energy security by managing backup power operation for critical loads if the microgrid is disconnected from the bulk grid (or “islanded”). The technology is scalable and is applicable to multiple DoD installations that contain renewable resources. However, the economic value and security of such a system cannot be determined in the absence of real-world testing on a DoD installation. The system needs to be integrated with real-world generation and loads to assess its performance and finalize design details. To date, nearly 50 demonstrations are under way across DoD as part of ESTCP’s Installation Energy Test Bed (see figure 3.8). DoD plans to continue this program in FY2012. A competitive process is under way to identify the next round of technology demonstrations in the following areas: 1) Smart microgrids and energy storage to increase energy security on DoD installations 2) Renewable energy generation on DoD installations 3) Advanced component technologies to improve building energy efficiency 4) Advanced building energy management and control 5) Tools and processes for design, assessment, and decision making associated with energy use and management The interest from industry has been extremely high. Companies see the ongoing demonstrations as crucial means of bringing their technologies to full commercialization and widespread deployment. The current solicitation has attracted enormous interest, highlighting the pent-up need for efforts to move energy technologies beyond research and development and to overcome the Valley of Death.

Plan

Plan: The Department of Defense should initiate a demonstrative power-purchase agreement of Small Modular Reactors.

Contention 2: Nuclear Industry

US nuclear industry is dead now- SMR’s are the vital internal link into jump-starting the dormant US nuclear industry- DOD action is key to overcome market barriers and eliminate the stigma surrounding nuclear energy

Loudermilk and Andres ’10 (Richard B. Andres is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University and a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Micah J. Loudermilk is a researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Reactors and the Military's Role in Securing America's Nuclear Industry”, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/100823646-small-reactors-and-the-militar.htm, April 23, 2010, LEQ)

Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a renewed push for clean energy, the stage is set for a vibrant revival of the nuclear power industry in the United States. During his 2008 campaign, President Barack Obama committed to setting the country on the road to a clean, secure, and independent energy future - and nuclear power can play a vital role in that. With abundant energy resources available and near-zero emission levels, nuclear power offers a domestically-generated, clean, and long-term solution to America's energy dilemma. While countries around the world are building new reactors though, the U.S. nuclear power industry has remained dormant - and even borders on extinction - as no new plants have been approved for construction in the more than three decades following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Although Congress and the Executive Branch have passed laws and issued proclamations over the years, little actual progress has been made in the nuclear energy realm. A number of severe obstacles face any potential entrant into the reactor market - namely the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which lacks the budget and manpower necessary to seriously address nuclear power expansion. Additionally, public skepticism over the safety of nuclear power plants has impeded serious attempts at new plant construction. However, despite the hurdles facing private industry, the U.S. military is in a position to take a leading role in the advancement of nuclear reactor technology through the integration of small reactors on its domestic bases. While the Obama Administration has pledged $8 billion in federal loan guarantees to the construction of two new reactors in Georgia and an additional $36 billion in new guarantees to the nuclear industry, this comes on top of $18.5 billion budgeted, but unspent, dollars. Despite this aid, it is still improbable that the U.S. will see any new large reactors now or in the foreseeable future as enormous cost, licensing, construction, and regulatory hurdles must be overcome. In recent years though, attention in the nuclear energy sphere has turned in a new direction: small-scale reactors. These next-generation reactors seek to revolutionize the nuclear power industry and carry a host of benefits that both separate them from their larger cousins and provide a legitimate opportunity to successfully reinvigorate the American nuclear industry. When compared to conventional reactors, small reactors have a number of advantages. First, the reactors are both small and often scalable - meaning that sites can be configured to house one to multiple units based on power needs. Although they only exist on paper and the military has yet to embrace a size or design, the companies investing in these technologies are examining a range of possibilities. Hyperion, for example, is working on a so-called "nuclear battery" - a 25 MWe sealed and transportable unit the size of a hot tub. Similarly, Babcock & Wilcox - the company which built many of the Navy's reactors - is seeking licensing for its mPower reactor, which is scalable and produces 125 MWe of power per unit. Other designs, such as Westinghouse's International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) model, have a generating capacity of up to 335 MWe. Second, large reactors come with enormous price tags - often approaching $10 billion in projected costs. The costs associated with building new reactors are so astronomical that few companies can afford the capital outlay to finance them. Additionally, the risks classically associated with the construction of nuclear reactors serve as an additional deterrent to interested utilities. As a result, companies must be willing to accept significant financial risks since ventures could potentially sink them or result in credit downgrades - as evidenced by the fact that 40 of 48 utilities issuing debt to nuclear projects suffered downgrades following the accident at Three Mile Island. All of this adds up to an environment that is not conducive to the sponsorship of new reactor plants. On the other hand, small reactors are able to mostly circumvent the cost hurdles facing large reactors. During the construction of large reactors, utilities face "single-shaft risk" - forced to invest and tie up billions of dollars in a single plant. However, small reactors present the opportunity for utilities to buy and add reactor capacity as needed or in a step-by-step process, as opposed to an all-or-nothing approach. Small reactors are also factory-constructed and shipped, not custom-designed projects, and can be built and installed in half the time - all of which are cost-saving measures. Additionally, despite concerns from critics over the proliferation and safety risks that a cadre of small reactors would potentially pose, the reality is considerably different. On the safety side, the new designs boast a number of features - including passive safety measures and simpler designs, thus reducing the number of systems to monitor and potential for system failure, enhancing the safety of the reactors. Small reactors can often be buried underground, are frequently fully contained and sealed (complete with a supply of fuel inside), can run longer between refueling cycles, and feature on-site waste storage - all of which serve to further insulate and secure the units. Finally, due to their small size, the reactors do not require the vast water resources needed by large reactors and in the event of an emergency, are far easier to isolate, shut off, and cool down if necessary. Notwithstanding all of these benefits, with a difficult regulation environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, and skeptical public opinion, the nuclear energy industry faces an uphill - and potentially unwinnable - battle in the quest for new reactors in the United States. Left to its own devices it is unlikely, at best, that private industry will succeed in bringing new reactors to the U.S. on its own. However, a route exists by which small reactors could potentially become a viable energy option: the U.S. military. Since 1948, the U.S. Navy has deployed over 500 reactors and possesses a perfect safety record in managing them. At the same time, grave concern exists over the fact that U.S. military bases are tied to and entirely dependent upon the civilian electric grid - from which they receive 99% of their power. Recently, attention has turned to the fact that the civilian grid, in addition to accidents, is vulnerable to cyber or terrorist attacks. In the event of a deliberate attack on the United States that knocks out all or part of the electric grid, the assets housed at the affected bases would be unavailable and U.S. global military operations potentially jeopardized. The presence of small-scale nuclear reactors on U.S. military bases would enable these facilities to effectively become "islands" - insulating them from the civilian grid and even potentially deterring attacks if the opponent knows that the military network would be unaffected. Unlike private industry, the military does not face the same regulatory and congressional hurdles to constructing reactors and would have an easier time in adopting them for use. By integrating small nuclear reactors as power sources for domestic U.S. military bases, three potential energy dilemmas are solved at the same time. First, by incorporating small reactors at its bases, the military addresses its own energy security quandary. The military has recently sought to "island" its bases in the U.S. -protecting them from grid outages, be they accidental or intentional. The Department of Defense has promoted this endeavor through lowering energy consumption on bases and searching for renewable power alternatives, but these measures alone will prove insufficient. Small reactors provide sufficient energy output to power military installations and in some cases surrounding civilian population centers. Secondly, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, the stigma on the nuclear power industry will ease and inroads will be created for the adoption of small-scale reactors as a viable source of energy. Private industry and the public will see that nuclear reactors can indeed be utilized safely and effectively, resulting in a renewed push toward the expansion of nuclear power. Although many of the same hurdles will still be in place, a shift in public opinion and a stronger effort by utilities, coupled with the demonstrated success of small reactors on military bases, could prove the catalysts necessary for the federal government and the NRC to take more aggressive action. Finally, while new reactors are not likely in the near future, the military's actions will preserve, for a while longer, the badly ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. Nuclear power is here to stay around the globe, and the United States has an opportunity to take a leading role in supplying the world's nuclear energy and reactor technology. With the U.S. nuclear industry dormant for three decades, much of the attention, technology, and talent have concentrated overseas in countries with a strong interest in nuclear technology. Without the United States as a player in the nuclear energy market, it has little say over safety regulations of reactors or the potential risks of proliferation from the expansion of nuclear energy. If the current trend continues, the U.S. will reach a point where it is forced to import nuclear technology and reactors from other countries. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will both guarantee the survival of the American nuclear industry in the short term, and work to solidify support for it in the long run. Ultimately, between small-scale nuclear reactors and the U.S. military, the capability exists to revitalize America's sleeping nuclear industry and promoting energy security and clean energy production. The reactors offer the ability to power domestic military bases, small towns, and other remote locations detached from the energy grid. Furthermore, reactor sites can house multiple units, allowing for greater energy production - rivaling even large reactors. Small reactors offer numerous benefits to the United States and a path initiated by the military presents a realistic route by which their adoption can be achieved.

SMR’s would kick-start a global nuclear revival- that’s key to solve global warming and ensure US nuclear leadership

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah K. Loudermilk, Contributor Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, contracted through ASE Inc, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs”, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375, May 31, 2011, LEQ)

Economies of Scale Reversed? Safety aside, one of the biggest issues associated with reactor construction is their enormous costs—often approaching up to $10 billion apiece. The outlay costs associated with building new reactors are so astronomical that few companies can afford the capital required to finance them. Additionally, during the construction of new reactors, a multi-year process, utilities face “single-shaft risk”—forced to tie up billions of dollars in a single plant with no return on investment until it is complete and operational. When this is coupled with the risks and difficulties classically associated with reactor construction, the resulting environment is not conducive to the sponsorship of new plants. Conventional wisdom says that SMRs cannot be cost-competitive with large reactors due to the substantial economies of scale loss transitioning down from gigawatt-sized reactors to ones producing between 25MW and 300 MW, but, a closer examination may result in a different picture. To begin with, one of the primary benefits of SMRs is their modularity. Whereas conventional reactors are all custom-designed projects and subsequently often face massive cost overruns, SMRs are factory-constructed—in half the time of a large reactor—making outlay costs largely fixed. Moreover, due to their scalability, SMRs at a multi-unit site can come online as installed, rather than needing to wait for completion of the entire project, bringing a faster return on invested capital and allowing for capacity additions as demand increases over time. Other indirect cost-saving measures further increase the fiscal viability of small nuclear reactors. Due to the immense power output of conventional reactors, they also require special high-power transmission lines. In contrast, small reactor output is low enough to use existing transmission lines without overloading them. This allows for small reactors to serve as “drop-in” replacements at existing old fossil fuel-based power plants, while utilizing the transmission lines, steam turbines, and other infrastructure already in place. In fact, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) hopes to acquire two Babcock & Wilcox small reactors for use in this manner—perhaps precipitating a movement whereby numerous fossil fuel plants could be converted. Lastly, and often ignored, is the ability of small reactors to bring a secure energy supply to locations detached from the grid. Small communities across Canada, Alaska, and other places have expressed immense interest in this opportunity. Additionally, the incorporation of small reactors may be put to productive use in energy-intensive operations including the chemical and plastics industries, oil refineries, and shale gas extraction. Doing so, especially in the fossil fuels industry would free up the immense amounts of oil and gas currently burned in the extraction and refining process. All told, small reactors possess numerous direct and indirect cost benefits which may alter thinking on the monetary competitiveness of the technology. Nuclear vs. Alternatives: a realistic picture When discussing the energy security contributions offered by small nuclear reactors, it is not enough to simply compare them with existing nuclear technology, but also to examine how they measure up against other electricity generation alternatives—renewable energy technologies and fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and oil currently account for 45%, 23% and 1% respectively of US electricity generation sources. Hydroelectric power accounts for 7%, and other renewable power sources for 4%. These ratios are critical to remember because idealistic visions of providing for US energy security are not as useful as realistic ones balancing the role played by fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. Limitations of renewables Renewable energy technologies have made great strides forward during the last decade. In an increasingly carbon emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) aware global commons, the appeal of solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources is strong, and many countries are moving to increase their renewable electricity generation. However, despite massive expansion on this front, renewable sources struggle to keep pace with increasing demand, to say nothing of decreasing the amount of energy obtained from other sources. The continual problem with solar and wind power is that, lacking efficient energy storage mechanisms, it is difficult to contribute to baseload power demands. Due to the intermittent nature of their energy production, which often does not line up with peak demand usage, electricity grids can only handle a limited amount of renewable energy sources—a situation which Germany is now encountering. Simply put, nuclear power provides virtually carbon-free baseload power generation, and renewable options are unable to replicate this, especially not on the scale required by expanding global energy demands. Small nuclear reactors, however, like renewable sources, can provide enhanced, distributed, and localized power generation. As the US moves towards embracing smart grid technologies, power production at this level becomes a critical piece of the puzzle. Especially since renewable sources, due to sprawl, are of limited utility near crowded population centers, small reactors may in fact prove instrumental to enabling the smart grid to become a reality. Pursuing a carbon-free world Realistically speaking, a world without nuclear power is not a world full of increased renewable usage, but rather, of fossil fuels instead. The 2007 Japanese Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear outage is an excellent example of this, as is Germany’s post-Fukushima decision to shutter its nuclear plants, which, despite immense development of renewable options, will result in a heavier reliance on coal-based power as its reactors are retired, leading to a 4% increase in annual carbon emissions. On the global level, without nuclear power, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation would rise nearly 20% from nine to eleven billion tons per year. When examined in conjunction with the fact that an estimated 300,000 people per year die as a result of energy-based pollutants, the appeal of nuclear power expansion grows further. As the world copes simultaneously with burgeoning power demand and the need for clean energy, nuclear power remains the one consistently viable option on the table. With this in mind, it becomes even more imperative to make nuclear energy as safe as possible, as quickly as possible—a capacity which SMRs can fill with their high degree of safety and security. Additionally, due to their modular nature, SMRs can be quickly constructed and deployed widely. While this is not to say that small reactors should supplant large ones, the US would benefit from diversification and expansion of the nation’s nuclear energy portfolio. Path forward: Department of Defense as first-mover Problematically, despite the immense energy security benefits that would accompany the wide-scale adoption of small modular reactors in the US, with a difficult regulatory environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, skeptical public opinion, and of course the recent Fukushima accident, the nuclear industry faces a tough road in the battle for new reactors. While President Obama and Energy Secretary Chu have demonstrated support for nuclear advancement on the SMR front, progress will prove difficult. However, a potential route exists by which small reactors may more easily become a reality: the US military. The US Navy has successfully managed, without accident, over 500 small reactors on-board its ships and submarines throughout 50 years of nuclear operations. At the same time, serious concern exists, highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2008, that US military bases are tied to, and almost entirely dependent upon, the fragile civilian electrical grid for 99% of its electricity consumption. To protect military bases’ power supplies and the nation’s military assets housed on these domestic installations, the Board recommended a strategy of “islanding” the energy supplies for military installations, thus ensuring their security and availability in a crisis or conflict that disrupts the nation’s grid or energy supplies. DOD has sought to achieve this through decreased energy consumption and renewable technologies placed on bases, but these endeavors will not go nearly far enough in achieving the department’s objectives. However, by placing small reactors on domestic US military bases, DOD could solve its own energy security quandary—providing assured supplies of secure and constant energy both to bases and possibly the surrounding civilian areas as well. Concerns over reactor safety and security are alleviated by the security already present on installations and the military’s long history of successfully operating nuclear reactors without incident. Unlike reactors on-board ships, small reactors housed on domestic bases would undoubtedly be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation and certification, however, with strong military backing, adoption of the reactors may prove significantly easier than would otherwise be possible. Additionally, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, general fears over the use and expansion of nuclear power will ease, creating inroads for widespread adoption of the technology at the private utility level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, action by DOD as a “first mover” on small reactor technology will preserve America’s badly struggling and nearly extinct nuclear energy industry. The US possesses a wealth of knowledge and technological expertise on SMRs and has an opportunity to take a leading role in its adoption worldwide. With the domestic nuclear industry largely dormant for three decades, the US is at risk of losing its position as the global leader in the international nuclear energy market. If the current trend continues, the US will reach a point in the future where it is forced to import nuclear technologies from other countries—a point echoed by Secretary Chu in his push for nuclear power expansion. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will guarantee the short-term survival of the US nuclear industry and will work to solidify long-term support for nuclear energy. Conclusions In the end, small modular reactors present a viable path forward for both the expansion of nuclear power in the US and also for enhanced US energy security. Offering highly safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant designs, SMRs have the potential to bring carbon-free baseload distributed power across the United States. Small reactors measure up with, and even exceed, large nuclear reactors on questions of safety and possibly on the financial (cost) front as well. SMRs carry many of the benefits of both large-scale nuclear energy generation and renewable energy technologies. At the same time, they can reduce US dependence on fossil fuels for electricity production—moving the US ahead on carbon dioxide and GHG reduction goals and setting a global example. While domestic hurdles within the nuclear regulatory environment domestically have proven nearly impossible to overcome since Three Mile Island, military adoption of small reactors on its bases would provide energy security for the nation’s military forces and may create the inroads necessary to advance the technology broadly and eventually lead to their wide-scale adoption.

Three scenarios- first is warming

At the top- the nuclear industry is dying now- this will increase warming- fossil fuels are increasing and renewables are decreasing- but new power plants will thump any nuclear power disads

Tat ’12 (Chee Hong Tat, Chief Executive, Energy Market Authority of Singapore, “Singapore International Market Week Publication”, “SECURING OUR ENERGY FUTURE APRIL 2012”, LEQ)

Nuclear Faces The Long Road Back For the nuclear industry, recovery will depend on turning around public opinion u For the nuclear industry, Fukushima will stand as the fault line dividing two eras. Before the catastrophic events of March 2011, nuclear energy had been reborn as the clean energy of choice, having emerged from decades as the pariah of the energy family. But the earthquake and tsunami that ripped through the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant changed all of that, radically altering the energy landscape. For the atomic energy sector, it will be a long, hard and expensive road back. "Since the Fukushima disaster in Japan, the EU has begun to carry out comprehensive stress tests at its nuclear power plants," European Commissioner for Energy Mr GÜnther Oettinger said in a video pre- recorded for the Singapore International Energy Week (SIEW) 2011. "It [also] aims to put in place the most advanced legal framework for the sustainable use of nuclear energy." If anything, the Fukushima disaster has shown that nuclear power cannot operate in isolation, requiring instead a comprehensive and global approach to safety. "To strengthen nuclear safety world- wide, we would welcome other countries operating nuclear power plants to carry out similar assessments as soon as pos- sible," Mr Oettinger added. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has painted a gloomy picture of a world with what it calls a "low nuclear case". A reduced nuclear output will lead to "increased import bills, heightened energy security concerns, and make it harder and more expensive to combat climate change." In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, Germany, Europe's biggest economy, closed eight of its 17 reactors permanently. It later formally announced plans to shut down its nuclear programme within 11 years. While nuclear has made a muted comeback since Fukushima – the US recently reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear by opening two new nuclear units, the first in 15 years, experts see continuing challenges that will make it very difficult for the nuclear power industry to expand beyond a small handful of reactor projects. China promises that nuclear can be made safer. In particular, its research into safer thorium fuel cycle technology has been applauded by the nuclear lobby. Despite this, experts say nuclear programmes worldwide are set to contract rather than expand. The low nuclear case foresees the total amount of nuclear power capacity fall- ing from 393GW at the end of 2010 to 335GW in 2035, a little more than half the levels previously set out in IEA's New Policies Scenario. New Policies Scenario The share of nuclear power in total gen- eration will drop from 13 per cent in 2010 to just seven per cent in 2035, with implications for energy security, diversity of the fuel mix, spending on energy imports, and energy-related CO2 emissions. "It is clear now that without nuclear, we cannot meet CO2 reduction targets," said IEA's former Executive Director, Mr Nobuo Tanaka, when he opened SIEW 2011 with his keynote lecture. Or, as the agency’s Chief Economist, Dr Fatih Birol, posits – make power in general "viciously more expensive" and close the door to 2°C forever. A shift away from nuclear power "would definitely be bad news for energy security, for climate change and also for the eco- A shift away from nuclear power would definitely be bad news for energy security, for climate change, and also for the economics of the electricity price nomics of the electricity price," he added. Research into small modular reactors (SMR) is still in its infancy although the reduced cost of a 10MW modular unit that could power about 7,000 homes, compared with the one million homes from a conven- tional reactor, is receiving attention. ThE EvEr- ShriNkiNG piE The drastically-altered landscape can be seen in IEA projections for nuclear. Under its 2010 outlook, there was to be a 90 per cent increase in nuclear capacity. This compares with its latest projection of 60 per cent for the same period from 2011. While there will now be heavy reliance on the lighter emissions of gas to meet green house targets, the nuclear disaster has been an unexpected fillip for the renewables and alternative energy sector. The rise was driven by the solar power industry, where the value of transac- tions jumped by 56 per cent to $15.8 billion, to account for almost one-third of take-overs, according to advisory firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. Nevertheless, analysts say any surge in renewable energy is likely to be eclipsed by a return to coal, with a powerfully negative effect on CO2 emissions. Even before the Japanese earthquake, the nuclear industry was struggling. Weak power demand due to the reces-sion and cheaper alternatives such as gas and coal made it difficult to justify the hefty investment in reactors. Only those plants with strong government backing were going ahead. With nuclear-agnostic countries dropping plans for civil nuclear indus- tries, China remains the last hope of the beleaguered sector. While China froze approvals of new nuclear plants follow- ing Fukushima, it has already restarted its programme and the country is set to dominate the nuclear landscape. The PRC's 2020 target of reaching 80,000MW of nuclear capacity, from 10,000MW last year, may have been reduced due to delays caused by Fukush- ima. Nevertheless, its ambitious projects are putting most of the other countries' nuclear plans in the shade. Meanwhile, other emerging econo- mies, including India and the United Arab Emirates, are also planning signifi- cant investments in new reactors. Nuclear’s share of electricity generation is also likely to slip as other forms of generation grow more quickly. In the developed world, the emphasis is on finding alternatives to nuclear power. In Japan, which derived some 30 per cent of its electricity from nuclear power plants prior to Fukushima, efforts to regain public support for restarting the re- actors have made little headway. Since the tsunami, 52 out of the nation's 54 reactors have been offline as of March 2012. One important litmus of the industry's health has been companies that service the nuclear energy marketplace. They, too, have been repositioning themselves in an increasingly unattractive market. Shaw, the US civil engineering com- pany, has sold its 20 per cent stake in nuclear engineering group Westinghouse Electric Company to Toshiba of Japan. Toshiba, for its part, plans to sell the holding to another investor. General Electric, the US industrial group that is one of the world's lead- ing nuclear engineers through its joint venture with Hitachi of Japan, has said it does not hold out much hope for market growth in the immediate future. It now expects nuclear power to decline in importance as other parts of the business grow more rapidly. New Lesson: Getting More From Less What is emerging is that the nuclear sector is trying to eke more power out of existing plants and applying new technol- ogies to extend the lives of ageing reactors. In the US, 60 reactors have been given approval to have their working lives extended from 40 to 60 years. The capac- ity of existing nuclear plants is being increased. Since 1977, regulators have approved 139 upgrades in the US, adding about 6,000MW to the capacity of the US reactor fleet. Mr John Rowe, Chief Executive of Exelon, the largest US nuclear generator, has argued that these life extensions and modifications are a much more cost-ef- fective way of investing in nuclear power. Other countries, including Spain, Sweden and Finland, have also allowed significant upgrades. Lightbridge, a US nuclear fuels company, is offering a new type of metallic nuclear fuel. It claims this can increase output on an existing reactor by up to 17 per cent. Malaysia's Tan Sri Leo Moggie, Chairman of Tenaga Nasional Bhd, has said that proponents who point to the fact that Fukushima was an old plant with an outdated reactor that was soon to be decommissioned, are floundering in the face of the opposition ranged against nuclear power. Arguments that nuclear power is the only viable technology which can address issues of global warming and climate change ring hollow when faced with contrary public opinion. "The supporters of nuclear power will also point out that as a result of Fukushima, there will be more stringent regulatory rules and all design crite- ria are going to be further tightened," he said in his public lecture at the Singapore Energy Market Author- ity's (EMA) inaugural Distinguished Speaker Programme last April. "The challenge, post-Fukushima, however, is not strictly technical but one of public acceptance. "With all the images of the Fuku- shima nuclear plant meltdown fresh in their minds, together with footage of what happened in Chernobyl as Ukraine commemorated the 25th anniversary of the tragedy, it is unlikely that, at least in the short term, public opinion can be persuaded to support the use of nuclear power," he shared with audiences. For the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, like their European counterparts which have factored in nuclear as part of their energy generation mix, Fukushima will mean revisiting those plans. "It will also encourage pressure of public opinion for governments and utilities worldwide to focus more on the development of renewable energy and green energy technologies," Tan Sri Moggie said. If nuclear is to have a future, govern- ments will need to be cognisant of the cross-border impact of nuclear energy and for increased international co-opera- tion requiring it to maintain the highest safety, security, non-proliferation and environmental protection standards for nuclear generation. Of utmost importance, say policymak- ers, is the need to develop a common legislative framework with respect to the safety of nuclear installations and the management of spent fuel and radioac- tive waste. ■ Despite this, the limits of the extra power that can be squeezed out by these modifications are now being reached. public opiNioN ThE kEy Ultimately, the future of nuclear power lies not with the sector's companies or even with the governments that bankroll the projects, but with public opinion. Attitudes in Japan have hardened towards nuclear power. A year after the accident, anger against TEPCO and complacent government overseers runs deep in Fukushima and among a wider public who had been promised that Japan's nuclear plants were safe against the seismic misfortunes that plague Japan. Post-Fukushima polls suggest that somewhere between 41 and 54 per cent of Japanese support scrapping, or reduc- ing the numbers of nuclear power plants. The battle to win public acceptance will be crucial to the future of nuclear energy.

And SMR’s alone are sufficient to solve emissions- global spillover- the most qualified studies go aff

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created – that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities – if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a fulcrum for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to recapture technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

Now the impacts-

Extinction- tipping point

Dyer ‘12 -- London-based independent journalist, PhD from King's College London, citing UC Berkeley scientists (Gwynne, "Tick, tock to mass extinction date," The Press, 6-19-12, l/n, accessed 8-15-12, mss)

Meanwhile, a team of respected scientists warn that life on Earth may be on the way to an irreversible "tipping point". Sure. Heard that one before, too. Last month one of the world's two leading scientific journals, Nature, published a paper, "Approaching a state shift in Earth's biosphere," pointing out that more than 40 per cent of the Earth's land is already used for human needs. With the human population set to grow by a further two billion by 2050, that figure could soon exceed 50 per cent. "It really will be a new world, biologically, at that point," said the paper's lead author, Professor Anthony Barnofsky of the University of California, Berkeley. But Barnofsky doesn't go into the details of what kind of new world it might be. Scientists hardly ever do in public, for fear of being seen as panic-mongers. Besides, it's a relatively new hypothesis, but it's a pretty convincing one, and it should be more widely understood. Here's how bad it could get. The scientific consensus is that we are still on track for 3 degrees C of warming by 2100, but that's just warming caused by human greenhouse- gas emissions. The problem is that +3 degrees is well past the point where the major feedbacks kick in: natural phenomena triggered by our warming, like melting permafrost and the loss of Arctic sea-ice cover, that will add to the heating and that we cannot turn off. The trigger is actually around 2C (3.5 degrees F) higher average global temperature. After that we lose control of the process: ending our own carbon- dioxide emissions would no longer be enough to stop the warming. We may end up trapped on an escalator heading up to +6C (+10.5F), with no way of getting off. And +6C gives you the mass extinction. There have been five mass extinctions in the past 500 million years, when 50 per cent or more of the species then existing on the Earth vanished, but until recently the only people taking any interest in this were paleontologists, not climate scientists. They did wonder what had caused the extinctions, but the best answer they could come up was "climate change". It wasn't a very good answer. Why would a warmer or colder planet kill off all those species? The warming was caused by massive volcanic eruptions dumping huge quantities of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere for tens of thousands of years. But it was very gradual and the animals and plants had plenty of time to migrate to climatic zones that still suited them. (That's exactly what happened more recently in the Ice Age, as the glaciers repeatedly covered whole continents and then retreated again.) There had to be a more convincing kill mechanism than that. The paleontologists found one when they discovered that a giant asteroid struck the planet 65 million years ago, just at the time when the dinosaurs died out in the most recent of the great extinctions. So they went looking for evidence of huge asteroid strikes at the time of the other extinction events. They found none. What they discovered was that there was indeed major warming at the time of all the other extinctions - and that the warming had radically changed the oceans. The currents that carry oxygen- rich cold water down to the depths shifted so that they were bringing down oxygen- poor warm water instead, and gradually the depths of the oceans became anoxic: the deep waters no longer had any oxygen. When that happens, the sulfur bacteria that normally live in the silt (because oxygen is poison to them) come out of hiding and begin to multiply. Eventually they rise all the way to the surface over the whole ocean, killing all the oxygen-breathing life. The ocean also starts emitting enormous amounts of lethal hydrogen sulfide gas that destroy the ozone layer and directly poison land- dwelling species. This has happened many times in the Earth's history.

It will be rapid and quick- extinction

Light 12 (Malcolm, PhD, University of London – Earth science and climate consultant, “Global Extinction within one Human Lifetime as a Result of a Spreading Atmospheric Arctic Methane Heat wave and Surface Firestorm,” http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/p/global-extinction-within-one-human.html)

Although the sudden high rate Arctic methane increase at Svalbard in late 2010 data set applies to only a short time interval, similar sudden methane concentration peaks also occur at Barrow point and the effects of a major methane build-up has been observed using all the major scientific observation systems. Giant fountains/torches/plumes of methane entering the atmosphere up to 1 km across have been seen on the East Siberian Shelf. This methane eruption data is so consistent and aerially extensive that when combined with methane gas warming potentials, Permian extinction event temperatures and methane lifetime data it paints a frightening picture of the beginning of the now uncontrollable global warming induced destabilization of the subsea Arctic methane hydrates on the shelf and slope which started in late 2010. This process of methane release will accelerate exponentially, release huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere and lead to the demise of all life on earth before the middle of this century. Introduction The 1990 global atmospheric mean temperature is assumed to be 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005; NASA, 2002; DATAWeb, 2012) which sets the 2 oC anomaly above which humanity will lose control of her ability to limit the effects of global warming on major climatic and environmental systems at 16.49 oC (IPCC, 2007). The major Permian extinction event temperature is 80 oF (26.66 oC) which is a temperature anomaly of 12.1766 oC above the 1990 global mean temperature of 14.49 oC (Wignall, 2009; Shakil, 2005). Results of Investigation Figure 1 shows a huge sudden atmospheric spike like increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard north of Norway in the Arctic reaching 2040 ppb (2.04 ppm)(ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic - Methane - Emergency - Group.org). The cause of this sudden anomalous increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard has been seen on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf where a recent Russian - U.S. expedition has found widespread, continuous powerful methane seepages into the atmosphere from the subsea methane hydrates with the methane plumes (fountains or torches) up to 1 km across producing an atmospheric methane concentration 100 times higher than normal (Connor, 2011). Such high methane concentrations could produce local temperature anomalies of more than 50 oC at a conservative methane warming potential of 25. Figure 2 is derived from the Svalbard data in Figure 1 and the methane concentration data has been used to generate a Svalbard atmospheric temperature anomaly trend using a methane warming potential of 43.5 as an example. The huge sudden anomalous spike in atmospheric methane concentration in mid August, 2010 at Svalbard is clearly evident and the methane concentrations within this spike have been used to construct a series of radiating methane global warming temperature trends for the entire range of methane global warming potentials in Figure 3 from an assumed mean start temperature of -3.575 degrees Centigrade for Svalbard (see Figure 2) (Norwegian Polar Institute; 2011). Figure 3 shows a set of radiating Arctic atmospheric methane global warming temperature trends calculated from the steep methane atmospheric concentration gradient at Svalbard in 2010 (ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic-Methane-Emergency-Group.org). The range of extinction temperature anomalies above the assumed 1990 mean atmospheric temperature of 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005) are also shown on this diagram as well as the 80 oF (26.66 oC) major Permian extinction event temperature (Wignall, 2009). Sam Carana (pers. com. 7 Jan, 2012) has described large December 2011 (ESRL-NOAA data) warming anomalies which exceed 10 to 20 degrees centigrade and cover vast areas of the Arctic at times. In the centres of these regions, which appear to overlap the Gakkel Ridge and its bounding basins, the temperature anomalies may exceed 20 degrees centigrade. See this site:http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/map/images/fnl/sfctmpmero1a30frames.fnl.anim.html The temperature anomalies in this region of the Arctic for the period from September 8 2011 to October 7, 2011 were only about 4 degrees Centigrade above normal (Carana, pers. com. 2012) and this data set can be seen on this site: http://arctic-newsblogspot.com/p/arctic-temperatures.html Because the Svalbard methane concentration data suggests that the major spike in methane emissions began in late 2010 it has been assumed for calculation purposes that the 2010 temperature anomalies peaked at 4 degrees Centigrade and the 2011 anomalies at 20 degrees Centigrade in the Gakkel Ridge region. The assumed 20 degree Centigrade temperature anomaly trend from 2010 to 2011 in the Gakkel Ridge region requires a methane gas warming potential of about 1000 to generate it from the Svalbard methane atmospheric concentration spike data in 2010. Such high methane warming potentials could only be active over a very short time interval (less than 5.7 months) as shown when the long methane global warming potential lifetimes data from the IPCC (2007; 1992) and Dessus, Laponte and Treut (2008 ) are used to generate a global warming potential growth curve with a methane global warming potential of 100 with a lifespan of 5 years. Because of the high methane global warming potential (1000) of the 2011, 20 oC temperature anomalies in the Gakkel Ridge region, the entire methane global warming potential range from 5 to 1000 has been used to construct the radiating set of temperature trends shown in Figure 3. The 50, 100, 500 and 1000 methane global warming potential (GWP) trends are red and in bold. The choice of a high temperature methane peak with a global warming potential near 1000 is in fact very conservative because the 16 oC increase is assumed to occur over a year. The observed ESRL-NOAA Arctic temperature anomalies varied from 4 to 20 degrees over less than a month in 2011 (Sam Carana, pers. comm. 2012). […] . This very narrow temperature range includes all the mathematically and visually determined extinction times and their means for the northern and southern hemispheres which were calculated quite separately (Figure 7; Table 1). Once the world's ice caps have completely melted away at temperatures above 22.49 oC and times later than 2051.3, the Earth's atmosphere will heat up at an extremely fast rate to reach the Permian extinction event temperature of 80oF (26.66 oC)(Wignall, 2009) by which time all life on Earth will have been completely extinguished. The position where the latent heat of ice melting curve intersects the 8 oC extinction line (22.49 oC) at 2051.3 represents the time when 100 percent of all the ice on the surface of the Earth will have melted. If we make this point on the latent heat of ice melting curve equal to 1 we can determine the time of melting of any fraction of the Earth's icecaps by using the time*temperature function at each time from 2051.3 back to 2015, the time the average Arctic atmospheric temperature curve is predicted to exceed 0 oC. The process of melting 1 kg of ice and heating the produced water up to a certain temperature is a function of the sum of the latent heat of melting of ice is 334 kilo Joules/kg and the final water temperature times the 4.18 kilo Joules/Kg.K (Wikipedia, 2012). This however represents the energy required over a period of one second to melt 1 kg of ice to water and raise it to the ambient temperature. Therefore the total energy per mass of ice over a certain time period is equal to (334 +(4.18*Ambient Temperature)*time in seconds that the melted water took to reach the ambient temperature. From the fractional time*temperature values at each ambient temperature the fractional amounts of melting of the total global icecaps have been calculated and are shown on Figure 9. The earliest calculated fractional volume of melting of the global ice caps in 2016 is 1.85*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice with an average yearly rate of ice melting of 2.557*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice. This value is remarkably similar to, but slightly less than the average rate of melting of the Arctic sea ice measured over an 18 year period of 2.7*10^-3 (1978 to 1995; 2.7% per decade - IPCC 2007).This close correlation between observed rates of Arctic ice cap and predicted rates of global ice cap melting indicates that average rates of Arctic ice cap melting between 1979 and 2015 (which represents the projected time the Arctic will lose its ice cover - Masters, 2009) will be continued during the first few years of melting of the global ice caps after the Arctic ice cover has gone in 2015 as the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature starts to climb above 0 oC. However from 2017 the rate of melting of the global ice will start to accelerate as will the atmospheric temperature until by 2049 it will be more than 9 times as fast as it was around 2015 (Table 2). The mean rate of melting of the global icecap between 2017 and 2049 is some 2*10^-2, some 7.4 times the mean rate of melting of the Arctic ice cap (Table 2). In concert with the increase in rate of global ice cap melting between 2017 and 2049, the acceleration in the rate of melting also increases from 7*10^-4 to 9.9*10^-4 with a mean value close to 8.6*10^-4 (Table 2). The ratio of the acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting to the Arctic ice cap melting increases from 3.4 in 2017 to 4.8 by 2049 with a mean near 4.2. This fast acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting after 2015 compared to the Arctic sea ice cap melting before 2015 is because the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature after 2017 is spiraling upward in temperature above 0 oC adding large amounts of additional energy to the ice and causing it to melt back more quickly. The melt back of the Arctic ice cap is a symptom of the Earth's disease but not its cause and it is the cause that has to be dealt with if we hope to bring about a cure. Therefore a massive cut back in carbon dioxide emissions should be mandatory for all developed nations (and some developing nations as well). Total destruction of the methane in the Arctic atmosphere is also mandatory if we are to survive the effects of its now catastrophic rate of build up in the atmospheric methane concentration However cooling of the Arctic using geoengineering methods is also vitally important to reduce the effects of the ice cap melting further enhancing the already out of control destabilization of the methane hydrates on the Arctic shelf and slope. · Developed (and some developing) countries must cut back their carbon dioxide emissions by a very large percentage (50% to 90%) by 2020 to immediately precipitate a cooling of the Earth and its crust. If this is not done the earthquake frequency and methane emissions in the Arctic will continue to grow exponentially leading to our inexorable demise between 2031 to 2051. · Geoenginering must be used immediately as a cooling method in the Arctic to counteract the effects of the methane buildup in the short term. However these methods will lead to further pollution of the atmosphere in the long term and will not solve the earthquake induced Arctic methane buildup which is going to lead to our annihilation. · The United States and Russia must immediately develop a net of powerful radio beat frequency transmission stations around the Arctic using the critical 13.56 MHZ beat frequency to break down the methane in the stratosphere and troposphere to nanodiamonds and hydrogen (Light 2011a) . Besides the elimination of the high global warming potential methane, the nanodiamonds may form seeds for light reflecting noctilucent clouds in the stratosphere and a light coloured energy reflecting layer when brought down to the Earth by snow and rain (Light 2011a). HAARP transmission systems are able to electronically vibrate the strong ionospheric electric current that feeds down into the polar areas and are thus the least evasive method of directly eliminating the buildup of methane in those critical regions (Light 2011a). The warning about extinction is stark. It is remarkable that global scientists had not anticipated a giant buildup of methane in the atmosphere when it had been so clearly predicted 10 to 20 years ago and has been shown to be critically linked to extinction events in the geological record (Kennett et al. 2003). Furthermore all the experiments should have already been done to determine which geoengineering methods were the most effective in oxidising/destroying the methane in the atmosphere in case it should ever build up to a concentration where it posed a threat to humanity. Those methods need to be applied immediately if there is any faint hope of reducing the catastrophic heating effects of the fast building atmospheric methane concentration.

Scenario two is the economy-

Nuclear industry revival would increase skilled labor and manufacturing in the US- boost the industrial economy

Adams ’10 (Rod Adams. Naval War College diploma in National Policy and Strategy (with highest honors) May 2003 - GPA 4.0, Pro-nuclear advocate with small nuclear plant operating and design experience. Former submarine Engineer Officer. Founder, Adams Atomic Engines, Inc. Host and producer, The Atomic Show Podcast, “Nuclear Industry Can Lead a Revival in Skilled Labor and Manufacturing in the United States”, http://atomicinsights.com/2010/11/nuclear-industry-can-lead-a-revival-in-skilled-labor-and-manufacturing-in-the-united-states.html, November 15, 2010, LEQ)

The Nuclear Energy Institute, the American Nuclear Society and the North American Young Generation in Nuclear have been investing time and money into focused workforce development programs for several years. The people leading the effort are taking the action to ensure that there are educated and trained people who are ready to meet the challenge of continuing to reliably operate and maintain our existing fleet of 104 nuclear reactors at the same time that we are reestablishing our nuclear plant manufacturing and construction industry. In 1950 manufacturing accounted for more than 30 percent of all U.S. employment. These skilled labor careers provided an unprecedented standard of living for more than two decades following the end of World War II, allowing millions of Americans to purchase homes and autos and pay for their children to go to college. By 2006, manufacturing employment shrunk to a mere 10 percent of U.S. employment and with it the bulk of America’s well-paying skilled labor careers. Prognosticators predicted manufacturing’s ultimate demise as a significant driver of the American economy. But a look at the U.S. nuclear industry tells a different story: a narrative where job growth in the skilled trades is on an upward trend and the industry can serve as a role model for the revitalization of the U.S. manufacturing sector through the creation of new careers and economic expansion. In fact, it already has.

And revitalization of the US manufacturing sector is the vital internal link into overcoming the recession- it would solve for job growth and sustainable economic growth- but energy efficiency is key to this process

Hutchinson ’12 (Robert Hutchinson and Ryan Matley, Managing Director Robert "Hutch" Hutchinson is a managing director for the research and consulting activities at RMI, Ryan Matley isConsultant with RMI’s electricity practice, where he focuses on the implementation of demand side management programs, including analyzing new business models and program approaches to improve uptake. In addition to research work on RMI’s Reinventing Fire and Next Generation Utility initiatives, Ryan has worked on consulting engagements in the areas of industrial process efficiency, renewable energy and the future of the electricity system. “Can Radical Efficiency Revive U.S. Manufacturing?”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=undertake-radical-efficiency-to-revive-us-industry&offset=2, March 16, 2012, LEQ)

Both traditional and new U.S. industries will have to increase energy efficiency if the nation is to retain its global position as a leading manufacturer Industry has long formed the foundation of America's economy, from before the first Ford Model T factory to the military-industrial complex that grew out of two world wars to the robust economic growth and high-tech innovation that followed. And whereas U.S. manufacturing is experiencing a resurgence, its old foundation—built on cheap fossil fuels and plentiful electricity—is showing cracks. Rising and volatile fuel prices, supply-security concerns and pressures on the environment are wrecking balls thumping away at many of the underpinnings of our country's key industries—and thus our prosperity. Fortunately, we can render these wrecking balls harmless through a systematic drive to upgrade industrial energy efficiency. Even with no technology breakthroughs such an effort can, in just over a generation, transform U.S. industry and provide 84 percent more output in 2050 consuming 9 to 13 percent less energy and 41 percent less fossil fuel than it uses today. This scenario, outlined in Reinventing Fire, a book and strategic initiative by Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), can help U.S. industry build durable competitive advantage and keep jobs from going overseas. These seem like incredible numbers: Twice today's efficiency? Output nearly doubled with reduced energy use? The opportunity is so significant because, in spite of efficiency gains over the past decade, plentiful opportunities for energy efficiency remain for industry. The U.S. Department of Energy's 24 industrial assessment centers, which have offered energy audits for more than 30 years, report that energy savings per recommendation increased by 9 percent between 1985 and 2005. Turning our wastefulness into profit is our biggest opportunity to reinvent fire. Dramatic efficiency gains in industry can be enabled by transformations occurring in tandem in other key sectors of our economy. For example, the hugely energy-intensive petroleum refining industry will shrink or eventually disappear as vehicles electrify. But efficiency can be doubled in two main ways: applying new technologies to old sectors, and applying old technologies to new sectors. Adding new technologies to old sectors A well-known success story is the steel industry. Since it recovered from the capacity overhang and devastating mill closures of the 1970s, it has quietly expanded with state-of-the-art facilities. The energy intensity to produce a ton of steel fell 40 percent from 1978 to 2008. This was driven by a new technology well suited to our scrap-rich economy: the share of steel production from electric arc furnaces (EAFs) grew from 25 percent to nearly 60 percent. EAFs recycle steel scrap in an electric furnace to produce new steel, bypassing the energy-intensive, coking coal–powered step of converting iron ore to metallic iron, and then to steel in a conventional blast furnace. Adding EAFs close to scrap sources has also pulled steel recycling rates up to the mid-80 percent range in recent years. Even the conventional route has a more efficient alternative that is starting to make inroads. Steel industry bellwether Nucor recently broke ground on a new direct reduced iron plant in Louisiana. This innovation replaces coal with natural gas in the iron ore conversion step. If the steel industry continues to adopt new technology, it can help lead the transition outlined in Reinventing Fire. Some old industries have less positive stories. Pulp and paper is still struggling with declining demand for its core product, a dynamic that stymies investment in new and existing facilities. Paper mills are often net-zero or even net energy producers, so many would ask: Why bother? But pulping typically produces a potentially valuable by-product—black liquor. Gasifying it has the potential to transform the industry, unlocking the opportunity for the pulp and paper producer of the past to become the biorefinery of the future—producing a portfolio of products alongside paper, from renewable electricity to boutique chemicals and bulk biofuels. A new industrial system could leverage what once was considered waste. In Kalundborg, Denmark, for example, materials and energy flow in a symbiotic dance among a refinery, power plant, pharmaceutical factory, drywall plant and fish farm—transforming waste from one operation into valuable fodder for another, and even supplying heat to the city of Kalundborg and fertilizer to surrounding farms. The flagging paper sector could similarly help lead in reinventing fire, instead of fleeing to countries that grow trees faster than we do.

Independently- SMR’s would create a significant export market- this would also give us leverage over non-proliferation concerns

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

6.2.2 Export Sales of FOAK SMR Plants Previous studies have documented the potential for a significant export market for U.S. SMRs, mainly in lesser developed countries that do not have the demand or infrastructure to accommodate GW-scale LWRs. Clearly, the economics of SMR deployment depends not only on the cost of SMR modules, but also on the substantial upgrades in all facets of infrastructure requirements, particularly in the safety and security areas, that would have to be made, and as exemplified by the ongoing efforts in this direction by the United Arab Emirates (and, in particular, by Abu Dhabi). This is a substantial undertaking for these less developed countries. Thus, such applications may be an attractive market opportunity for FOAK SMR plants, even if the cost of such plants may not have yet achieved all of the learning benefits. The Department of Commerce has launched the Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative, which seeks to identify the key trade policy challenges and the most significant commercial opportunities. The Initiative encompasses all aspects of the U.S. nuclear industry, and, as part of this effort, the Department identified 27 countries as “markets of interest” for new nuclear expansion. A recent Commerce Department report identified that “SMRs can be a solution for certain markets that have smaller and less robust electricity grids and limited investment capacity.” Studies performed by Argonne National Laboratory suggest that SMRs would appear to be a feasible power option for countries that have grid capacity of 2,000-3,000 MW. Exports of SMR technology also could play an important role in furthering non-proliferation policy objectives. The design of SMR nuclear fuel management systems, such as encapsulation of the fuel, may have non-proliferation benefits that merit further assessment. Also, the development of an SMR export industry would be step toward a U.S.-centric, bundled reliable fuel services. Exports of FOAK plants help achieve learning without the need for a full array of production incentives required for domestic FOAK deployments. Projected, unsubsidized, electricity market prices will likely be higher in selected foreign markets, particularly when the electricity pricing is based on liquefied natural gas import prices. 49 This situation would enable SMRs to be in a more favorable competitive position. SMR exports would qualify, if needed, for export credit assistance under current U.S. government programs, but this assistance would not require the need for new federal funding.

SMR’s would provide a massive employment boost and our export market

King et. al. ’11 (Marcus King , LaVar Huntzinger , Thoi Nguyen, CNA Think Tank, Environment and Energy Team, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations”, March 31, 2011, LEQ)

Benefits to American exports Because construction of nuclear power plants in the United States has been dramatically reduced since new orders were placed in the 1970s, manufacturing expertise and capability for constructing large nuclear reactors has diminished. Special forgings for parts of large nuclear reactors will have to be made overseas at the cost of potential jobs in the United States. SMRs, however, can be constructed in the United States using current technical expertise and manufacturing capability. Unlike larger units, SMRs could be shipped as already assembled modules to foreign countries. Creating small nuclear power plants for U.S. and foreign buyers could contribute thousands of jobs in manufacturing, nuclear engineering, transportation, construction, and nuclear power plant operations. 7. A hybridized nuclear/F-T process concept proposed by Idaho National Laboratory, uses nuclear power to convert water to hydrogen and oxygen in order to increase the overall efficiency of a coal-to-liquid process [41]. Hydrocarbon fuels produced by F-T methods have combustion characteristics similar to jet fuels and diesels. The U.S. Air Force recently certified a 50:50 mixture of JP-8 and F-T derived kerosene as fuel for B-52, C-17, B-1, and F- 15 aircraft in non-combat operation. 29

Not the impacts-

Extinction

Auslin ‘9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman, Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

Conversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, the souring of the political environment must be expected to fan the corrosive protectionist tendencies and nationalistic economic policy responses that are already all too much in evidence. After spending much of 2008 cheerleading the global economy, the International Monetary Fund now concedes that output in the world's advanced economies is expected to contract by as much as 2% in 2009. This would be the first time in the post-war period that output contracted in all of the world's major economies. The IMF is also now expecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in 2010, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. Sadly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging-market economies will not be spared by the ravages of the global recession. Output is already declining precipitously across Eastern and Central Europe as well as in a number of key Asian economies, like South Korea and Thailand. A number of important emerging-market countries like Ukraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil-dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full-blown currency crisis. Perhaps of even greater concern is the virtual grinding to a halt of economic growth in China. The IMF now expects that China's growth rate will approximately halve to 6% in 2009. Such a growth rate would fall far short of what is needed to absorb the 20 million Chinese workers who migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political and social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International Labor Organization. The ILO believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 30 million jobs worldwide in 2009, while in a worst case scenario as many as 50 million jobs could be lost. What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

Scenario 3 is non-proliferation

SMR’s are key to secure US nuclear global leadership- nuclear development is inevitable globally which triggers any nuclear power bad turns but absent US leadership it risk unsafe proliferation

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah K. Loudermilk, Contributor Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, contracted through ASE Inc, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs”, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375, May 31, 2011, LEQ)

For years, proponents of nuclear power expansion both in the US and around the world have been proclaiming the onset of a global “nuclear renaissance.” Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a stronger push for clean energy sources, the stage seemed set for a vibrant revival of the industry. Nuclear power’s 25 years of accident-free operation following the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl shed favorable light upon the industry, dulled anti-nuclear arguments, and brought noted environmentalists into the nuclear camp as they began to recognize the role nuclear power could play in promoting clean energy solutions. The March 2011 failure at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi reactor following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami reignited the debate over nuclear energy and erased much of the goodwill that the nuclear industry had accumulated. Now, at least in the US, where images of Three Mile Island had finally faded, nuclear energy again finds its future in doubt. However, the Fukushima incident notwithstanding, the fundamental calculus driving the renewed push for nuclear power has not changed: in a carbon-conscious world with burgeoning electricity demands, nuclear power represents the only option for substantial and reliable baseload power generation. In recent years, though the “renaissance” has yet to occur, thinking on the nuclear power development front has begun to shift away from traditional gigawatt-plus reactors and towards a new category of small modular reactors (SMRs). Boasting an unprecedented degree of reactor safety and multiple applications in the power-generation process, these reactors could revolutionize the nuclear power industry and contribute to US energy security while also reviving the flagging American nuclear industry. Though they have yet to be built and deployed, years of SMR research, including a two-decade experiment with the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), a 20 MWe reactor at Argonne-West in Idaho, demonstrate the potential of such technology. Nuclear vs. Nuclear: why go small? As the EBR-II demonstrates, the concept of small reactors is not new, but has resurfaced recently. The United States Navy has successfully utilized small reactors to power many of its vessels for over fifty years, and the earliest power reactors placed on land in the US were mostly similar, though larger, iterations of the Navy’s reactors. Eventually, due to siting and licensing issues affecting economies of scale, reactor outputs were pushed ever higher to between 800 and 1200 MW and new reactors constructed today—such as the ones under construction at the Olkiuoto plant in Finland—approach as much as 1600 MW. In contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines a small reactor as generating under 300 MW of power. On the surface, a move in this direction may appear to be a step backwards in development, however, amid concerns over issues including safety, proliferation risks, and cost, many in the industry are beginning to seriously examine the possible applications of widespread and distributed nuclear power from low-output reactors. Promoting safer nuclear power The debate over nuclear energy over the years has consistently revolved around the central question “Is nuclear power safe?” Certainly, the events at Fukushima illustrate that nuclear power can be unsafe, however, no energy source is without its own set of some inherent risks on the safety front—as last year’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the long-term environmental consequences of fossil fuel use demonstrate—and nuclear power’s operating record remains significantly above that of other energy sources. Instead, accepting the role that nuclear energy plays in global electricity generation, especially in a clean-energy environment, a more pointed question to ask is “How can nuclear power be made safer?” Although large reactors possess a stellar safety record throughout their history of operation, SMRs are able to take safety several steps further, in large part due to their small size. Due to simpler designs as a result of advancing technology and a heavy reliance on passive safety features, many problems plaguing larger and earlier generations of reactors are completely averted. Simpler designs mean less moving parts, less potential points of failure or accident, and fewer systems for operators to monitor. Additionally, small reactor designs incorporate passive safety mechanisms which rely on the laws of nature—such as gravity and convection—as opposed to human-built systems requiring external power to safeguard the reactor in the event of an accident, making the reactor inherently safer. Furthermore, numerous small reactor concepts incorporate other elements—such as liquid sodium—as coolants instead of the pressurized water used in large reactors today. While sodium is a more efficient heat-transfer material, it is also able to cool the reactor core at normal atmospheric pressure, whereas water which must be pressurized at 100-150 times normal to prevent it boiling away. As an additional passive safety feature, sodium’s boiling point is 575-750 degrees higher than the reactor’s operating temperature, providing an immense natural heat sink in the event that the reactor overheats. Even should an accident occur, without a pressurized reactor no radiation would be released into the surrounding environment. Even on the most basic level, small reactors provide a greater degree of security by merit of providing lower energy output and using less nuclear fuel. To make up for the loss in individual reactor generating capacity, small reactors are generally designed as scalable units, enabling the siting of multiple units in one location to rival the output capacity of a large nuclear plant. However, with each reactor housed independently and powering its own steam turbine, an accident affecting one reactor would be limited to that individual reactor. Combating proliferation with US leadership Reactor safety itself notwithstanding, many argue that the scattering of small reactors around the world would invariably lead to increased proliferation problems as nuclear technology and know-how disseminates around the world. Lost in the argument is the fact that this stance assumes that US decisions on advancing nuclear technology color the world as a whole. In reality, regardless of the US commitment to or abandonment of nuclear energy technology, many countries (notably China) are blazing ahead with research and construction, with 55 plants currently under construction around the world—though Fukushima may cause a temporary lull. Since Three Mile Island, the US share of the global nuclear energy trade has declined precipitously as talent and technology begin to concentrate in countries more committed to nuclear power. On the small reactor front, more than 20 countries are examining the technology and the IAEA estimates that 40-100 small reactors will be in operation by 2030. Without US leadership, new nations seek to acquire nuclear technology turn to countries other than the US who may not share a deep commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Strong US leadership globally on nonproliferation requires a vibrant American nuclear industry. This will enable the US to set and enforce standards on nuclear agreements, spent fuel reprocessing, and developing reactor technologies. As to the small reactors themselves, the designs achieve a degree of proliferation-resistance unmatched by large reactors. Small enough to be fully buried underground in independent silos, the concrete surrounding the reactor vessels can be layered much thicker than the traditional domes that protect conventional reactors without collapsing. Coupled with these two levels of superior physical protection is the traditional security associated with reactors today. Most small reactors also are factory-sealed with a supply of fuel inside. Instead of refueling reactors onsite, SMRs are returned to the factory, intact, for removal of spent fuel and refueling. By closing off the fuel cycle, proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel running the reactors are mitigated and concerns over the widespread distribution of nuclear fuel allayed.

And lack of US-enforced safe-guards concerning nuclear development risk terrorist acquisition – our evidence is the most qualified- at the current rate nuclear terrorism is inevitable

Brill and Luongo ’12 (Kenneth C. Brill is a former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A.Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. Both are members of the Fissile Material Working Group, a nonpartisan nongovernmental organization, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html, March 15, 2012, LEQ)

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism. Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. There is a consensus among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive action. At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material. A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” Surely after such an event, global leaders would produce a strong global system to ensure nuclear security. There is no reason to wait for a catastrophe to build such a system. The conventional wisdom is that domestic regulations, U.N. Security Council resolutions, G-8 initiatives, I.A.E.A. activities and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear terrorism. But existing global arrangements for nuclear security lack uniformity and coherence. There are no globally agreed standards for effectively securing nuclear material. There is no obligation to follow the voluntary standards that do exist and no institution, not even the I.A.E.A., with a mandate to evaluate nuclear security performance. This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices. Obama’s initiative in launching the nuclear security summit process in Washington in 2010 helped focus high-level attention on nuclear security issues. Unfortunately, the actions produced by the 2010 Washington Summit and that are planned for the upcoming Seoul Summit are voluntary actions that are useful, but not sufficient to create an effective global nuclear security regime. The world cannot afford to wait for the patchwork of nuclear security arrangements to fail before they are strengthened. Instead, we need a system based on a global framework convention on nuclear security that would fill the gaps in existing voluntary arrangements. This framework convention would commit states to an effective standard of nuclear security practices, incorporate relevant existing international agreements, and give the I.A.E.A. the mandate to support nuclear security by evaluating whether states are meeting their nuclear security obligations and providing assistance to those states that need help in doing so. Nuclear terrorism is a real and present danger for all states, not just a few. Preventing it is an achievable goal. The current focus on nuclear security through voluntary actions, however, is not commensurate with either the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism. This must be rectified. If the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit makes this a priority, there can be an effective global nuclear security regime in place before this decade ends.

Nuclear terrorism causes risk accidental retaliation with Russia and China- sparks a nuclear war

Ayson ‘10 (Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it [is] detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

And failure for the DOD specifically to act as the first mover risks foreign domination of the market- that is key to check unreliable and unsafe proliferation

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors.38 Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs, including the Hy- perion Power Module (Los Alamos National Labora- tory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and proliferation resistance.

Prolif causes global nuclear war - no stabilizing effect

Utgoff 2 - Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources @ the Institute for Defense Analyses (Victor, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44:2, Summer, p. 87-90)

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible.In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Contention 3: Solvency

First- the Department of Defense is the key agency to fund Small Modular Reactors- a demonstration project will get the industry off the ground

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

DoD as first Mover Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many un- certainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mo- bility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. How- ever, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities—that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the mar- ketplace.28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense- related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a pre- vailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even ar- gued that small reactors could play a key role in the sec- ond nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leader- ship role now.

DOD needs make or break the solvency of the Affirmative- DOD implementation is vital to get optimal capabilities- this takes out any free market counterplans

Andres and Breetz ‘11 (Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)

Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, net- work and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.

SMR’s are an energy game changer- but DOD purchasing agreements are key to just-start the industry and determining optimal configurations

Madia ’12 (William Madia, Stanford Energy Journal, Dr. Madia serves as Chairman of the Board of Overseers and Vice President for the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford University. Previously, he was the Laboratory Director at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from 2000-2004 and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory from 1994-1999., “SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: A POTENTIAL GAME-CHANGING TECHNOLOGY”, http://energyclub.stanford.edu/index.php/Journal/Small_Modular_Reactors_by_William_Madia, Spring 2012, LEQ)

There is a new type of nuclear power plant (NPP) under development that has the potential to be a game changer in the power generation market: the small modular reactor (SMR). Examples of these reactors that are in the 50-225 megawatt electric (MW) range can be found in the designs being developed and advanced by Generation mPower (http://generationmpower.com/), NuScale (http://nuscale.com/), the South Korean SMART reactor (http://smart.kaeri.re.kr/) and Westinghouse (http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/smr/index.htm/). Some SMR concepts are up to 20 times smaller than traditional nuclear plants Today’s reactor designers are looking at concepts that are 5 to 20 times smaller than more traditional gigawatt-scale (GW) plants. The reasons are straightforward; the question is, “Are their assumptions correct?” The first assumption is enhanced safety. GW-scale NPPs require sophisticated designs and cooling systems in case of a total loss of station power, as happened at Fukushima due to the earthquake and tsunami. These ensure the power plant will be able to cool down rapidly enough, so that the nuclear fuel does not melt and release dangerous radioactive fission products and hydrogen gas. SMRs are sized and designed to be able to cool down without any external power or human actions for quite some time without causing damage to the nuclear fuel. The second assumption is economics. GW-scale NPPs cost $6 billion to $10 billion to build. Very few utilities can afford to put this much debt on their balance sheets. SMRs offer the possibility of installing 50-225 MW of power per module at a total cost that is manageable for most utilities. Furthermore, modular configurations allow the utilities to deploy a more tailored power generation capacity, and that capacity can be expanded incrementally. In principle, early modules could be brought on line and begin producing revenues, which could then be used to fund the addition of more modules, if power needs arise. The third assumption is based on market need and fit. Utilities are retiring old fossil fuel plants. Many of them are in the few hundred MW range and are located near load centers and where transmission capacity currently exists. SMRs might be able to compete in the fossil re-power markets where operators don’t need a GW of power to serve their needs. This kind of “plug and play” modality for NPPs is not feasible with many of the current large-scale designs, thus giving carbon-free nuclear power an entry into many of the smaller markets, currently not served by these technologies. There are numerous reasons why SMRs might be viable today. Throughout the history of NPP development, plants grew in size based on classic “economies of scale” considerations. Bigger was cheaper when viewed on a cost per installed kilowatt basis. The drivers that caused the industry to build bigger and bigger NPPs are being offset today by various considerations that make this new breed of SMRs viable. Factory manufacturing is one of these considerations. Most SMRs are small enough to allow them to be factory built and shipped by rail or barge to the power plant sites. Numerous industry “rules of thumb” for factory manufacturing show dramatic savings as compared to “on-site” outdoor building methods. Significant schedule advantages are also available because weather delay considerations are reduced. Of course, from a total cost perspective, some of these savings will be offset by the capital costs associated with building multiple modules to get the same total power output. Based on analyses I have seen, overnight costs in the range of $5000 to $8000 per installed kilowatt are achievable. If these analyses are correct, it means that the economies of scale arguments that drove current designs to GW scales could be countered by the simplicity and factory-build possibilities of SMRs. No one has yet obtained a design certification from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for an SMR, so we must consider licensing to be one of the largest unknowns facing these new designs. Nevertheless, since the most developed of the SMRs are mostly based on proven and licensed components and are configured at power levels that are passively safe, we should not expect many new significant licensing issues to be raised for this class of reactor. Still, the NRC will need to address issues uniquely associated with SMRs, such as the number of reactor modules any one reactor operator can safely operate and the size of the emergency planning zone for SMRs. To determine if SMRs hold the potential for changing the game in carbon-free power generation, it is imperative that we test the design, engineering, licensing, and economic assumptions with some sort of public-private development and demonstration program. Instead of having government simply invest in research and development to “buy down” the risks associated with SMRs, I propose a more novel approach. Since the federal government is a major power consumer, it should commit to being the “first mover” of SMRs. This means purchasing the first few hundred MWs of SMR generation capacity and dedicating it to federal use. The advantages of this approach are straightforward. The government would both reduce licensing and economic risks to the point where utilities might invest in subsequent units, thus jumpstarting the SMR industry. It would then also be the recipient of additional carbon-free energy generation capacity. This seems like a very sensible role for government to play without getting into the heavy politics of nuclear waste, corporate welfare, or carbon taxes. If we want to deploy power generation technologies that can realize near-term impact on carbon emissions safely, reliably, economically, at scale, and at total costs that are manageable on the balance sheets of most utilities, we must consider SMRs as a key component of our national energy strategy.

And a purchase-power agreement solves best- it incentivizes private market action while reducing overhead cost of electricity for the government – creates a win/win- multiple markets exist

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

6.2 GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF MARKET TRANSFORMATION INCENTIVES Similar to other important energy technologies, such as energy storage and renewables, “market pull” activities coupled with the traditional “technology push” activities would significantly increase the likelihood of timely and successful commercialization. Market transformation incentives serve two important objectives. They facilitate demand for the off-take of SMR plants, thus reducing market risk and helping to attract private investment without high risk premiums. In addition, if such market transformation opportunities could be targeted to higher price electricity markets or higher value electricity applications, they would significantly reduce the cost of any companion production incentives. There are three special market opportunities that may provide the additional market pull needed to successfully commercialize SMRs: the federal government, international applications, and the need for replacement of existing coal generation plants. 6.2.1 Purchase Power Agreements with Federal Agency Facilities Federal facilities could be the initial customer for the output of the LEAD or FOAK SMR plants. The federal government is the largest single consumer of electricity in the U.S., but its use of electricity is widely dispersed geographically and highly fragmented institutionally (i.e., many suppliers and customers). Current federal electricity procurement policies do not encourage aggregation of demand, nor do they allow for agencies to enter into long-term contracts that are “bankable” by suppliers. President Obama has sought to place federal agencies in the vanguard of efforts to adopt clean energy technologies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Executive Order 13514, issued on October 5, 2009, calls for reductions in greenhouse gases by all federal agencies, with DOE establishing a target of a 28% reduction by 2020, including greenhouse gases associated with purchased electricity. SMRs provide one potential option to meet the President’s Executive Order. One or more federal agency facilities that can be cost effectively connected to an SMR plant could agree to contract to purchase the bulk of the power output from a privately developed and financed LEAD plant. 46 A LEAD plant, even without the benefits of learning, could offer electricity to federal facilities at prices competitive with the unsubsidized significant cost of other clean energy technologies. Table 4 shows that the LCOE estimates for the LEAD and FOAK-1plants are in the range of the unsubsidized national LCOE estimates for other clean electricity generation technologies (based on the current state of maturity of the other technologies). All of these technologies should experience additional learning improvements over time. However, as presented earlier in the learning model analysis, the study team anticipates significantly greater learning improvements in SMR technology that would improve the competitive position of SMRs over time. Additional competitive market opportunities can be identified on a region-specific, technology-specific basis. For example, the Southeast U.S. has limited wind resources. While the region has abundant biomass resources, the estimated unsubsidized cost of biomass electricity is in the range of $90-130 per MWh (9-13¢/kWh), making LEAD and FOAK plants very competitive (prior to consideration of subsidies). 47 Competitive pricing is an important, but not the sole, element to successful SMR deployment. A bankable contractual arrangement also is required, and this provides an important opportunity for federal facilities to enter into the necessary purchase power arrangements. However, to provide a “bankable” arrangement to enable the SMR project sponsor to obtain private sector financing, the federal agency purchase agreement may need to provide a guaranteed payment for aggregate output, regardless of actual generation output. 48 Another challenge is to establish a mechanism to aggregate demand among federal electricity consumers if no single federal facility customer has a large enough demand for the output of an SMR module. The study team believes that highlevel federal leadership, such as that exemplified in E.O. 13514, can surmount these challenges and provide critical initial markets for SMR plants.

Government intervention sparks learning benefits of projects - this overcomes any economic barriers- absent purchasing agreements though SMR’s will fail

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir ’11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf, November 2011, LEQ)

As illustrated in the previous discussion, until significant learning benefits are achieved, the LEAD SMR plant and some number of FOAK SMR plants may not be competitive with new natural gas combined-cycle generation. Estimates of the number of SMR modules that may not be competitive and the magnitude of the difference in cost are subject to significant uncertainty. The estimates are dependent upon at least three key variables: the initial cost estimates for the LEAD SMR design, the learning rate, and the future price of natural gas. The potential range of uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 4, which identifies the generation cost differential ($/MWh) between the family of SMR plants (LEAD, FOAK, and NOAK) and gas-fired plants for a variety of natural gas price scenarios. This analysis adopts the 10% learning assumption and the overnight cost estimate of $4,700/kW. If natural gas prices remain indefinitely depressed, these scenarios are unlikely to materialize, and the gaps will be significantly higher for the entire family of SMR plants.24 Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace, as the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive. Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit. However, the combination of the large upfront capital investment, the long period before a return on capital may be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on investment make it unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive. The present analysis assumes that government incentives will be essential to bridging this gap and accelerating private sector investment (see Appendix D). It is the study team’s understanding that DOE has proposed to share the cost of certain SMR design and licensing study activities. This section analyzes possible options for government incentives for early deployments (LEAD and FOAK plants) in addition to federal cost sharing for the design and licensing effort. The present analysis considers several alternative approaches to providing such incentives, either in the form of direct or indirect government financial incentives, or through market transformation actions that will spur demand for FOAK plants in competitive applications. The study team’s approach is to identify targeted, least-cost incentives that could form the basis for further dialogue between stakeholders and policy makers. Possible financial incentives need to be designed and evaluated relative to a particular management model for deployment of LEAD and FOAK plants. The study team’s management model assumes that these initial SMR plants will be managed and financed by the private sector, consisting of a possible consortium of the SMR vendor, the reactor module manufacturer, other major vendors, a host-site utility company, and one or more other electricity generation or vertically integrated utilities. The types of incentives that could be structured for this type of management model are discussed in the subsections that follow.